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INTRODUCTION
The country desk officer labors in a field of endeavour which,
paradoxically, attracts and repels Americans who are concerned for the
welfare of their country. He is an integral part of that Department
of State bureaucracy which is damned by conservatives for going too far
and by liberals for not going far enough. Detractors perceive Department
personnel as pansies in striped trousers rushing from one formal tea to
another. Businessmen accuse them of being indifferent to the needs of
U. S. business abroad. Headline- seeking Congressmen accuse them
alternately of wasting the substance of the U. S. taxpayers in grandiose
"give-away" programs or of being communists promoting Soviet interests
at the expense of those of the United States. As in all large organi-
zations, a few "rotten apples" have been discovered in the barrel,
seemingly lending credence to these views. That the "rotten apples"
have met with little success in infecting others or damaging policy is
indicative of the high caliber of the Foreign Service and Department of
State personnel.
In the following pages, it is proposed to investigate "the little
world of the desk officer" and how it impinges on national security policy,
The connection, at first glance, may appear tenuous* but, in fact, every
action of the country desk officer in the conduct of his day-to-day
affairs is taken consciously within parameters circumscribed by the
National Security Council.
This paper proposes to explore where and how desk officers originated.













received, and what training may he expect? rthat sort of career
pattern will he follow? .Vhat does the country aesk officer do now?
How does he do it? Finally, what proposals were made to change his
job, and how were they implemented?
The assistance derived from innumerable interviews with personnel
of the Poreign Service is gratefully acknowledged. These dedicated
personnel have borne ay questions patiently.
I wish also to acknowledge the continuing help of my wife, Lorene
Purcell Cone. i>he has managed to correct my grammatical errors,
suggest changes, provide encouragement, type the required copies, and
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THE NEXUS OF NATIONAL BCB&ITY KLICf AND FOREIGN POLICE
The National Security Council and Foreign Policy
The National Security Council
The National Security Council, as it functions under the National
Security Act of 1947 as amended, serves as a coordinating forum. In
its deliberations, this committee integrates the competing and com-
plementary aspects of national security, foreign policy, and domestic
policy. Robert Elder has aptly termed the Council "the highest cor.miittee
in the executive branch of the federal government for the resolution
of national security and foreign policy questions."
Robert Ellsworth Elder, The Policy Machine (Syracuse, New fork;
Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 13.
A few men of vision sought the means of correlating foreign policy
with military and economic capabilities even before World Afar II. That
global conflict illuminated the economic and political effects of
military operations and increased the pressure for such coordination.
Bismarck noted in his memoirs, some seventy years past, that the conduct
of war involved more than purely military campaigns to defeat the armed
forces of the enemy. The first tentative U. S. steps in this direction
were taken in 1944 with the creation, by agreement among the Secretaries,
of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. This body was reorganized
in the early postwar period as the State, Army, Navy, Air Force
Coordinating Committee in an attempt to resolve the requirement for an
- 1 -
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executive mechanism which would enable the executive to act rapidly
in response to security problems cutting across nearly all areas of
government responsibility.
The Eberstadt Report of 1945 suggested the creation of the National
Security Council, in light of British experience in high-level policy
coordination with their Imperial defense Council, a bod'/ successful in
national security operations since 1904. The recommendations contained
in this report were incorporated in President Truman's legislative
proposals to the Congress, which enacted the statutes creating the
National Security Council "to provide for the establishment of integrated
policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of
the Government relating to the national security." 2
"Excerpts from National Security Act of 1947, as amended," United
States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing
for National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington* Government Printing
Office, 1960), p. 1.
National Security Policy ancJ Foreign Policy
The United States emerged from >tforld Iftf II as the most powerful
single nation in the world. For this reason, influence on American
policy is the primary aim of every other foreign ministry in the world.
Our action or inaction in the diplomatic arena influences the course of
events everywhere. An action taken to resolve an important matter in
one place ignites a chain reaction of effect on every other problem
being processed. Thus our national security is dependent upon effective
foreign policies, and the National Security Council is the device to








The Secretary of State and National Security Policy
Under the circumstances described above, the primacy of the
Secretary of State in national security affairs is a we 11- recognized
conclusion. The nature of his duties gives him a perspective more
closely approximating the President* s than any other officer in the
executive branch. He is the principal advisor on economic and military
aid, cultural and information programs, arms control and disarmament,
diplomacy, and the coordination of all of these facets of foreign policy.
The Secretary of State is the only Cabinet Officer primarily charged
with looking at our nation as a whole in its relations with the rest
of the world, and his panoramic view is essential to national security
planning and policy. As our ranking diplomat, he stands at the inter-
section of foreign affairs; advocate of American policies to other
governments and official channel of suggestions and protests about
American policies from other governments. As harbinger of bad news and
transmitter of the "foreign point of view" to the President, the Congress,
and the U. S. agencies, he probably often feels "as welcome as a bastard
at a family reunion." Senator Jackson has stated that the Secretary
of State should advise the President "on the full range of national
security problems. In other words, he is sort of the orchestra leader."'3
"TJnited States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
State
, defense , and the National Security Council . Hearings before the
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 37th Congress, 1st Session,
August 1, 7, 17, and 24, 1961 (Washington; Government Printing Office,
1961), part IX.
If your mind runs riot in the wake of such metaphor as mine does,
your mind's eye will visualize Secretary Husk with a baton, Secretary








Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as first violin, assisted
in strings by the Treasury Department, while Director McCone ami assisting
C. I. A. types surreptitiously make cryptic corrections to the music.
It will be remembered that a piano player organizes this orchestra,
which now, though some term it McNamara's Band, Dean Rusk is leading.
Foreign Policy in the National Security Council
Senator Jackson has also indicated that the main work of the
National Security Council has thus far centered largely around the
consideration of foreign policy questions rather than national security
questions in their full contemporary sense. A major portion of the
Council* s deliberations has focused on the production and study of
"country papers" — what our national policy should be toward a
particular foreign nation.
The Department of State in National Security Policy
Limitations of the Secretary jf State
Even in this field, the role of the Secretary of State has its
limits. He cannot personally generate, correlate, coordinate, and in-
sure the feasibility of all policies and programs bearing on the world-
wide position of the nation. He must have adequate, knowledgeable
support.
The Secretary of State can neither abandon his Department in order
to spend time in the White House, nor can he engross himself in running
his Department. He is more than just another >»hite House assistant —
the head of a Department with an ancient and honorable history. Yet he
cannot permit others to advise the President on all critical issues
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of his dilemma. Proa less than 6,200 sundry personnel on the eve of
World Mar II, the Department of State has over 24,000 on its rolls
today, of which 17,000 are abroad.
The Secretary and His Department
The Secretary sits in a vast, new, polished steel and concrete
building amidst many advisors*.
... 2 Under Secretaries and 2 Deputy Under Secretaries, 13
Assistant Secretaries in charge of 13 bureaus, over 30
Deputy Assistant Secretaries, more than 60 area and other
Office Directors, and over 90 Country Desk Officers, together
with assorted advisors and special assistants, counselors
and inspector generals, and emissaries from the agencies
that lie only partly within the Secretary's jurisdiction.
4United States Congress, senate. Committee on Government Operations,
The Secretary of State
.
Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington-
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 5.
These personnel are organized to permit analysis of problems from both
geographical and functional points of view. Their world is divided into
five regions (Europe, Latin America, Middle bast, Africa, ana Far Last ) t
each under a separate bureau where policy making is centered.
The bureaus maintain a continuing dialogue with some 274 foreign
posts — embassies, legations, special missions, and consular offices.
The daily volume of message traffic comprises some 1,500 incoming and
1,500 outgoing cables amounting to more than 400,000 words.
The Country Desk Officer
At the bottom of the heap, some seven or eight levels down, is the
country desk officer. Between him and the Secretary are
:
The Under Secretary
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Subject to supervision and review from above, the country desk officer
concerns himself with policy toward a single nation.
Suaaary
The previous pages have outlined the intimate connection between
national security policy and foreign policy — a connection now so
inseparable that definitive lines between the two cannot be drawn. The
responsibility of the Secretary of State and his Department in national
security policy has been described. Herein was noted the relationship
of the country desk officer to the whole. The pages following will
present the development of his position, what he does, how he does it,





THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COUNTRY DESK. OFFICER
The "low man on the decision-making totem pole f " the desk officer,
owes his existence to the hierarchical development of the department of
State as it expanded to meet the needs of a nation expanding in inter-
national affairs. From a department of Foreign Affairs established in
1781 with a secretary and two clerks, the Department of State today has
a staff of about six thousand. Its growth has been sporadic, and until
recent times, seldom with concerted plan. Like Topsy, "it just growed."
Establishment of Geographical Divisions
The position of the desk officer became nebulous in tne establish-
ment of the first geographical division. In 1907, Huntington rtilson,
then the Third Secretary of State, worked out an elaborate plan of re-
organization which proposed the formation of four geographical divisions —
Latin American, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and Western European Affairs —
each to be administered by an expert, brought in from diplomatic or con-
sular service in those fields, who would thus provide the expertise for
existing conditions and problems. Though begun under the secretaryship
of Elinu Root, who had brought order to the haphazard documentary files,
this reorganization scheme received little encouragement from him. Some
six months after hearing the proposal, Secretary Root grudgingly suggested
that .Vilson take over the Far Eastern affairs as an experiment.
The Division of Latin American Affairs was established by a depart-




established the division of Western European Affairs and the division
of Near Eastern Affairs.
Establishment of Country Divisions
The First Country Desk Officer
By 1915, the Latin American Division (11 persons) was so over-
burdened with work pertaining to Mexico, as a result of the Mexican
Revolution and the problems resulting from it, that a departmental order
was issued, dated July 28, 1915, establishing a Division of Mexican Affairs.
Leon J. Canova, Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs,
was made chief of the new division, while Richard C. Xanis, a career
officer, became the assistant chief. Mr. Xanis remained in this division
until it was amalgamated with the Division of American Republics in 1937.
For all practical purposes, then, Leon J. Canova was the first country desk
officer, heading an office of seven persons. In the hierarchy of the
One might argue that Mr. Canova was, in fact, the chief of the
first task force, a task force which perpetuated itself bureaucratically
long after the reason for its being had passed.
State Department of that time, he ranked with the chiefs of the Divisions
of Far Eastern, Near Eastern, Western European, and Latin American Affairs.
The Short-Lived Russian Division
In 1919, the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (8 people) was likewise
found to be so heavily pressed with work pertaining to Russia, as a result
of the Russian Revolution and the problems arising therefrom, that a
Russian Division was created by departmental order. This Russian Division
was liquidated, being merged in the Division of Eastern European Affairs,









with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The Chief of
the Russian Division, then, was the second country desk officer in the
Apartment of State.
"Or the second chief of a task force, depending on the point of view.
The Office of Philippine Affairs
During the first administration of Franklin D, Roosevelt, the Office
of Philippine Affairs was established in the Department of State. This
agency was charged with carrying out the provisions of the Philippine
Independence Act of March 24, 1934, in so far as they related to the
Department of State. The first chief of the office, Joseph B. Jacobs,
might be termed a country desk officer, inasmuch as he dealt solely with
the affairs of the Philippines, rtith the advent of Philippine independence
in the post-war era, the agency* s functions decreased, its personnel
were assigned elsewhere, and the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs
was transferred in toto to function under the direction of the Dureau of
Far Eastern Affairs.
World <tiar II and Departmental Reorganization
The need for a thorough reorganization of the Department was recognized
as it expanded rapidly and in so many directions simultaneously under the
impact of World *ar II. As a means of delegating responsibilities, in
order to relieve the Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretary of their
many administrative functions, twelve offices were created, each headed
by a Director and a Deputy Director, with divisions placed under their
immediate direction. No office was responsible for more than six nor
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number so that where formerly there were only four such divisions, the
four offices which took their place were divided into nineteen divisions,
which made greater specialization possible. This specialization case
first in the American Area in early 1944 with the establishment of
divisions of Mexican, Brazilian, Bolivian, and Canadian Affairs. The
degree of specialization reached in the western hemisphere areas, prior
to such specialization in other geographic areas, is indicative of the
priority placed on western hemisphere affairs. This change, coupled
with the wording of the Departmental Order of January 15, 1944, which
placed the responsibility for the "coordination of policy and action
in regard to all aspects of relations with the . . . countries,"*'
3Text of departmental Order 1128 in Department of State Bulletin
.
January 15, 1944.
seemed to indicate an intention to combine economic and political aspects
of policy for application and coordination by division chiefs under the
direction of the Office director. These divisions, excepting Canaaa,
4Walter H. C. Laves and Francis 0. ^ilcox, "The Reorganization of
the Department of State," The American Political Science Review (April,
1944), pp. 2S9-301.
have remained in the Office of American Republic Affairs (since re-
organized and renamed the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs;. They were
the nascent form of the Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, and Canada country desks.
Two further reorganizations, one effected in Jecember, 1944, to
correct the deficiencies discovered in the wake of the hasty January,
1944, reorganization, and that undertaken as a result of the Hoover
Commission recommendation of 1949, have essentially fixed the structure






country desk officers scattered in five regional bureaus. 6one of
these desk officers administer our affairs with two or three countries,
but generally the principle of one country per desk officer applies.
The current organization of the Department and its regional bureaus is




RECRUITMENT — MERE BO DESK OFFICERS COME FROM?
In the dark clays following the birth of the republic, public-
spirited men of wide experience defended the interests of a weak, new
nation on the diplomatic front. It seens fortuitous that men of great
stature such as Robert R. Livingston, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund
Randolph, John Marshall, James Macsison, and James Monroe gave of them-
selves to establish the sound diplomatic practice which permitted the
stable growth of the republic.
The Spoils System ana Political Appointments
The age of Jackson ushered in a long and dreary period of neglect
ana abuse, with the inauguration of the spoils system, appointments to
the Department for political reasons, rather than for fitness, experience,
and ability, became commonplace. The patent injustices of the spoils
system, as applied to diplomatic and consular services, permitted in-
competent consuls to extort exhorbitant sums for their services and
forced ministers to make heavy personal expenditures to supplement their
inadequate allowances. These facts finally induced the Congress, in
1856, to pass a law providing a fixed salary for diplomatic officers and
consular officials, based on hierarchical rank. Another section of this
same act introduced a new idea — the merit principle. It provided for
the appointment by the President, upon certification by the Secretary
of State, of twenty-five "consular pupils of peculiar fitness and
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*Andor Klay, "Lesser Annals of departmental Troubles," Foreign
service Journal . A.UIII (May, 1956), p. 34.
limited, to recruit a body of young men for government service in the
hope that their early training might qualify then for promotion and
greater responsibility.
The hopes raised by this innovation were quickly dashed. Congress
stubbornly refused to appropriate monies to implement the creation of a





Another attempt to revive the merit principle was made in an act
of 1864 which provided for appointment, with permanency of tenure, of
thirteen clerks. Still there was no provision for insuring a continuing
flow of trained personnel into the department; and spoilsmen, changing
with the vagaries of the administration, thoroughly infested the
department.
The Merit System
As the continental frontier vanished and our nationalism turned
outward with the imperialism of "manifest destiny," the need for diplomatic
reform became obvious. Though political hacks were a feature of the
consular service as late as the McKinley Administration, the era of
reform, with which the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt
coincided, produced notable reforms. A three-man Board of Examiners
*M. McG. Harlow, "Evolution of American diplomacy,** Foreign Service
Journal
.









designated by the ^secretary of State had already been authorized by
President Cleveland, in 1895, to examine the fitness of appointees in
the consular service; ten years later the scope of consular examinations
was broadened by executive order, and vacancies in the diplomatic service
were authorized to be filled by transfer, promotion, or appointment
after examination. The Congress revised the system for selecting con-
sular officials on April 5, 1906, and an executive order in the same
year placed consular appointments and promotions under the Civil Service
System, then twenty- three years old. By executive order in 1909,
jTracy H. Lay, The Foreign Service of the United States
.
(New fork;
Prentice-Hall, 1925), p. 22.
For provisions of this executive order and later amendments , see
Lay, o£. cit
.. pp. 398-402, and lUraer Plischke, Conduct of American
Diplomacy
.
(New York; D. Van Nostrand Company, 1950), p. 168.
President Taft, being determined to foster a career foreign service and
to rid it of dependence upon political patronage, brought diplomatic
officers below the chief-of-mission rank under Civil Service and
strengthened the composition and functions of the Board of Examiners of
the Department of State. By the outbreak of vorld War I, the efficiency
of the Department had improved to a marked degree, but it was still
difficult to find men willing to make a career in the poorly-paid
Department. For some Department positions and for the diplomatic service,
a private income was an absolute essential. An enactment of February 5,
1915, graded diplomatic secretaries and consuls-general into five classes
each and consuls into nine, besides fixing their salaries.
6See Lay, ojj. cit












With the reluctant acknowledgement of the status of the United
States as a world power, with interests in the four corners of the earth,
as a result of victorious participation in *orld *ar I, the Congress was
more favorably inclined to overhaul the patchwork of Congressional
statute and executive order which formed the legal basis for the operation
of the Department and the Foreign Service. The diplomatic branch of the
Foreign Service numbered about 122, virtually all of whose members
possessed private wealth; the consular officers, some 511 strong, were
generally political appointees serving at the pleasure of the President,
7
The Rogers Act of May 23 9 1924, supplied the remedial and con-
7
43 Stat. 140; also see Lay, op_. cit .. pp. 407-416.
structive legislation urged by the Secretary of otate to correct faults
existing in the organization of the Department. Representative John
Jacob Rogers had interested himself in the effort to reorganize the
machinery for the conduct of American foreign relations and saw the bill
bearing his name take the diplomatic and consular services out of politics
g
once and for all. Consular and diplomatic officers alike became Foreign
gExcepting only appointments of ambassadors and ministers, which
are still made at the discretion of the President.
Service officers, and appointment to the new Poreign Service became
limited to open, competitive examinations witn commissions granted to
a class and not a particular post. A career service, composed of officers
recruited when young for long tenure and orderly advancement based on
merit, was presaged by the Rogers Act.
- 15 -
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The Rogers Act, among its other features, authorized the assign-
went of Foreign Service officers to the Department without loss of pay,
thereby permitting some alleviation in their continuous official exile
and presaging their future assignment as desk officers after suitable
field experience. There were also provisions for the subsequent re-
admission to the Foreign Service of career officers appointed as chiefs
of mission* a retirement and aisability system, authorization for pay-
ment of representation allowances; and family travel ana subsistence
expense authorization.
"At first the act stimulated enthusiasm and raised morale and
efficiency. It also aroused interest in the service as a career, as
shown by the number of candidates taxing the first entrance examinations
Q
in 1925." Under its provisions, president Coolidge created a Foreign
QRichard S. Patterson, "The Foreign Service; Four Decades of
Development," Department of State News Letter . U&II Quly.. 1964), p. 3.
Service Personnel Board, and the Department established a Foreign Service
School Board.
Unfortunately, all of the deficiencies of the Foreign Service were
not remedied. Some officers of the Department performing substantive
work in international politics were not consolidated into the Foreign
Service. Further, salaries which ranged from ^3,000 per annum in Class IX
to ^9,000 per annum in Class I were still too low to attract capable but
poor personnel. Career officers were still reluctant to accept promotions
to the rank of minister or ambassador because of inadequate salaries and
niggardly representation allowances. In aduition, the Personnel Board,
in making recommendations for promotion under the act, adopted practices




officer objections and dissatisfactions led to a House request for
information and a Senate resolution for an investigation. The Con-
gressional criticisms and the recommendations made in their light led
to revisions which were incorporated in the Moses-Linthicum net of 1931.
Yet, all of the developments following in the wake of the Rogers
Act did not have a deleterious effect on personnel policies. "»nith
foresight, the department began assigning some gifted junior officers
to study the languages, history, and social customs of Russia, the Far
iiast, and the Arab countries — all later critical areas. Under
10Ibid., p. 4.
Secretary Grew, noting that only nineteen of fifty ministers and
ambassadors were career men in 1926, urged Secretary kellogg to invite
the attention of the President to the desirability of replacing various
inefficient political appointees with Foreign Service officers.
Short-sighted fiscal measures in an era of prosperity cut off
promotions and other benefits promised by the Rogers Act, causing dis-
couragement and further discontent. Morale of the Service was low when
Secretary Stimson assumed his office in March, 1929. But President
Hoover understood the monetary needs for the conduct of foreign relations,
and Secretary Stimson was so persuasive with the House Appropriations
Committee, that funds were provided for promotions, rent allowances, and
modest representation funds.
The Moses-Linthicum Act
Senator George H. Moses, a former minister to Greece and Montenegro
(1909-1912), and Representative John C. Linthicum sponsored the act which
- 17 -
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bears their names to remedy some of the defects of the Rogers Act and
to advance the development of the Foreign Service. Under its terms,
the Foreign Service Personnel Board was reorganized to insure its
impartiality* the system of officer classification was modified, salaries
were raised, and automatic within-class increases were instituted; more
generous representation and post allowances were provided, annual and
sick leave with pay were instituted, a more liberal retirement system
was initiated, and career status for foreign service clerks was granted. Ai
UIbid.
The Effects of the depression
The Depression of the 1930* s unfortunately cancelled the gains
made under the Moses-Linthicum Act. The prevailing economic conditions
gave impetus to the government economy measures which suspended promotions,
reduced salaries 15 per cent, abolished post and representation allowances,
cut rent and living allowances by 65 per cent, and eliminated home leave
at government expense. Dollar devaluation further reuuced salaries
already cut, creating widespread hardship and distress among members of
the Foreign Service and their families.
The number of Foreign Service officers dropped from 762 to 688
between July, 1932, and December, 1934, A lack of recruitment funds
created a gap of four years when no one entered the Service. President
Roosevelt's stringent economy measures further injured both the Depart-
ment and the Foreign Service. Indeed, Secretary Hull's first telegram
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Thus as world conditions created vastly increasing demands for its
services, the Foreign Service struggled along under greater burdens
with insufficient funds.
The depression and the nascent expansion of the power and size of
the Federal Government combined to attract young and talented personnel.
There was no lack of qualified competitors for the small number of
appointments made annually following the resumption of entrance
examinations in 1933. By the latter portion of that year, the worst
of the Depression had passed, and the Service had gained most of the
salary and allowance benefits granted by the Moses-Linthicuro Act.
The Effects of World Mar II on Recruitment
With the outbreak of global war in Europe for a second time in a
generation, the United States had a single Foreign Service in which
admission was gained by open, competitive examination and advancement
through proven ability. Respite some "deadwood" remaining among
The foreign services of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture,
and the Bureau of Mines, w'vich had been established between 1927-1935,
were incorporated into the Foreign Service by a reorganization act
passed in 1935. Treasury Attaches are still to be found abroad. See
Arthur i« MacMahon, Administration in Foreign Affairs
.
(University,
Alabama* University of Alabama Press, 1953), p. 226.
pre-Rogers Act political appointees,
The Foreign Service of the United States at the outbreak
of the second World War was in the ^ain maae up of a corps
of able, unselfish, and devoted public servants in whom
the values of the career service *ere deeply ingrained,
laboring conscientiously under occasionally trying conditions








14Virgil P. Randolph, III, "The Recruitment of Junior Foreign
Service Officers 1945-1955," (unpublished Master's thesis, The
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1956), p. 16.
The decision was made in 1940 to seek no preferred status under
Selective Service for Foreign Service personnel. After the examination
given in the fall of 1941, all recruiting was suspended to eliminate
competition with the armed forces. Because of the cessation of recruiting
and statutory limitations on the total number of officers occupying the
six highest classes, promotion also ceased during rtorld Mar II.
Recruitment Since rtorld War II
Owing to the wider responsibilities of the United States after the
war, the department was faced with a twofold recruiting problem. There
was, first, a need for rapid expansion to meet immediate requirements
and, second, the need for careful and painstaking rebuilding of the
career service. The first need accentuated the requirement for a number
of specialists* the second stressed attracting personnel with a general
liberal arts background.
In 1945 and 1946, the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service
decided to hold shortened examinations specifically aimed at recruiting
veterans of the armed forces and personnel of the Foreign Service
Auxiliary in order to build up the career service. The expediency of
There were 976 of these in 1945 as compared to only 820 career
officers. See Elton Atwater, "The American Foreign Service Since 1939,"
American Journal of International Law. XLI (January, 1947), p. 79.
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As a result of these examinations, over 400 new officers were
appointed to the lowest rank of the Foreign Service. Until July, 1945,
when it was raised to 1160, the authorized strength was 866. This was
again increased to 1280 for the fiscal year 1947. See Atwater, o^. cit.,
p. 93.
The Bloom Bill and Lateral £ntry
The "Bloom Bill" of May 3, 1945, was enacted as a stop-gap measure
to remove the disabilities of a number of officers in the upper grades
of the Service and to improve the status of non-career personnel. A
provision of the bill, struck out before passage by amendment, would
have authorized entry into the Foreign Service of some 120 persons whose
special fitness and qualifications would have been demonstrated by prior
service in other federal agencies or in the armed forces. This con-
troversial "lateral entry" feature unexpectedly aroused such strong
opposition from supporters of the career principle that it was stricken —
temporarily. Yet the blear-eyed guardian of career principles grudgingly
admitted that some sort of lateral entry would strengthen the Department,
if carefully administered, at a time when trained and experienced
specialists were needed. Thus the Foreign Service Manpower Bill was
passed on July 3, 1946, authorizing the appointment of 250 specialized
personnel within two years, as additional career officers. These personnel
were to be appointed to classified grades commensurate with their
experience in the armed forces or their previously-held positions of
responsibility in other federal agencies.
17
It was feared that undue training would be required to compensate
for a lack of field experience and that the career principle would be
irreparably harmed. These fears were wholly false, because the depart-
ment of State so cautiously and parsimoniously administered these appoint-
ments that seven years later only 165 appointments had been made, 69 of
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The Foreign Service Act of 1946
dhile the Congress engaged in the polemics of the Manpower Act,
the division of Foreign Service Planning feverishly prepared new basic
legislation for the Foreign Service, because the Rogers Act and its
subsequent amendments was considered obsolescent. Their labors were
accorded sanctity in Public Law 724, 79th Congress, commonly called
^*or a complete narration of its legislative history, see Harold
Stein, "The Foreign Service Act of 1946," Public Administration and Policy
development — A Case Book, (New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p;>. 28-42.
the Poreign Service Act of 1946.
This act did nothing to alter the traditional method of recruitment
to the lowest grades of the Foreign Service offices. It reclassified all
Foreign Service officers into six grades and superimposed a new grade of
career minister. This latter grade was created for the accommodation of
Foreign Service officers promoted to chief of diplomatic mission who
wished to remain in the Service. A Foreign Service Reserve was created
to permit the appointment of highly competent specialized or technical
personnel for short terms of service. A Staff Corps of twenty-two grades
was established for administrative, clerical, fiscal, and custodial
responsibilities. A lateral entry feature was provided for controlled
entry of highly qualified Reserve, Staff Corps, or i>epartnental personnel
into the career service after comprehensive mental and physical examinations
as prescribed by the Board of 1-xaminers. In the hard fight to gain its
passage in the Congress, the question of specialist versus generalist
was raised and debated hotly. Implicit in the passage of the act was
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Stagnation
The Board of Examiners felt pleased with the results of the first
post-war examinations and decided to administer the same type of
examination in the fall of 1948. In the meantime, they determined
that a statistical study of examinations held since 1932 might prove
of value in modifying examination methods and procedures.
An incidence of 47 per cent of candidates otherwise successful
in passing written examinations failed the modern language portion.
Further, reductions in appropriations would permit only replacement of
current vacancies in the Service, new expansion could not be contemplated.
The standards of the written examinations which permitted 20 per cent to
pass were raised to allow passage of only 17 per cent.
In spite of more stringent examining procedures, a backlog of one
hundred candidates, certified eligible by the Board of Examiners, had
accumulated by early 1949. These persons were placed on an Eligible List
and were notified that they would be appointed when funds became available.
Some of the best of these candidates were lost forever, because they were
unable to await problematical appointment indefinitely.
Meanwhile, under the lateral entry feature of the Manpower Act of
1946, some 2,542 applications were received. Because reduced appropriations
made it impossible to permit the lateral entry of the 250 new career
officers envisaged, the Board of Examiners instituted a set of elaborate
screening devices which were approved by the Secretary of 5tate. Of
the 2,542 applicants, only 817 were designated to take the oral
examinations; 330 individuals pas ed the oral examinations; 205 of these
candidates were declared eligible for appointment under further restrictive
standards; 199 of these were certified as eligible for appointment,
- 23 -
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34 of this group withdrew in disgust after being offered appointments
at too low a salary* and only 165 new officers were finally appointed.
It was felt that "many highly intelligent, highly educated, and
highly competent men with excellent records ... were unsuccessful.
19
Joseph E. Green, "The Manpower Act in Retrospect," Foreign
Service Journal
.
aXVI (April, 1949), p. 44.
The principal difficulty faced by the Board of Examiners was determining
the class to which the candidate for lateral entry should be appointed.
The Board and the candidate often disagreed.
By the summer of 1949, some 156 candidates were eligible for appoint-
ment to almost non-existent vacancies in Class VI, while 30 new college
graduates had been enspleyed by the department as interns. Additionally,
the Staff Corps had become the vehicle for entrance into the Foreign
Service of persons whose service was intended to be only temporary or
semi-permanent, who could not pass the regular entrance examinations,
or who enjoyed influential political connection. A few of these managed
transfer into the permanent officer corps.
By the end of 1949, seme 166 candidates were on the Eligible List
awaiting appointment. Some of these had been waiting nearly two years.
Sixty-five additional candidates were added to the Eligible List in the
first half of 1950, despite further raising the standards for admission.
In June of 1950, a change occurred in recruitment policy. Eighty-
three new Class VI officers were appointed, and the Board of i-xamincrs
was urged to produce as many successful candidates as possible. By
January, 1951, only a handful remained on the Eligible List, but more
than a dozen excellent candidates had refused to continue their inter-
minable wait. The damage had been done.
- 24 -




The Congress and the public had been debating the course of
American foreign policy since the end of ftorld tfar II. during the
course of the controversy, one of the questions raised was whether
specially-trained personnel were required by the national interest in
carrying out the aims of American foreign policy; and if so, should
they be professional members of a Poreign Service Officer Corps or
members of a single foreign affairs service closely affiliated with,
or a part of, the *>epartment of State.
A Committee on Organisation of the fcxecutive Branch of the
Government (the Hoover Commission) was created in accordance with Public
Law 162 of the 80th Congress. One of its many suggestions concerning
the reorganization of the Ue^artment of State was s
The personnel in the permanent department establishment
in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above
certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of
years into a single foreign affairs service, divided into
grades and divisions, obligated to serve at home or overseas
and constituting a safeguarded career group acministered
separately from the general Civil Service as it now exists. °
20Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs (Appendix H) (Washington;
Government Printing Office, January, 1949), p. 28.
The Hoover Commission findings resulted in the enactment of Public
Law 73 of the 81st Congress, which placed responsibility for the
administration, coordination, and direction of the personnel of the
Foreign Service upon the Secretary of State directly and formally. This
act, in turn, gave rise to the appointment, by the Secretary of State,






changes were required in the personnel systems of the department as a
consequence of the Hoover Commission's recommendations.
The Rowe-Ramspeck Committee
This committee, known informally as the "Rowe-Ramspeck Committee,"
generally concurred with the Hoover Commission that the many variations
in the several personnel systems administered by the Secretary ox' State
inhibited efficient management and effectiveness, i'hey also concurred
in the Hoover Commission recommendation that "there should be a single
but flexible personnel system for the department of State and the Foreign
Service instead of separate systems that exist at present," Vet the
21
"An Improved Personnel System for the x-onduct of Foreign Affairs,"
A Report to the Secretar y of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee
on Personnel (August, 1950), p. 3.
Committee also proposed that the recommended unified personnel system
be independent of the Civil Service system. Appointments, they
recommended, should be based on rigorous and comprehensive written, oral,
and physical examination which, it was found, insured the selection of
intelligent and educated individuals possessing a high devotion to duty
and potentiality for development.
In essence, the department of State rejected the Hoover Commission's
and Rowe-Ramspeck Committee's recommendations for a single personnel
system. Instead, the Department chose to create a closer relationship
between Foreign Service and Civil Service groups by means of administrative
action and minor legislative changes. Only lip service was paid to
the fundamental recommendation for amalgamation through permitting a
"larger" number of lateral entries into the Foreign Service by Civil
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entry by a directive of 1951, of 2,150 applications received by
November 1, 1951, only 25 of these had actually been taken into the
Foreign Service by 1954.
decline in Recruitment
A marked decline in the number of applicants seeking to take written
examinations was noted in the years 1949 through 1951. l'his slackening
of apparent interest in the Foreign Service prompted the Executive
director of the Hoard of Examiners to investigate this phenomenon.
Letters were addressed to the presidents of some 266 colleges Mrt
universities requesting their opinions as to why candidates for Class VI
22
appointments had fallen off.
A brief discussion of this decline may be found in William
Yandell Elliott, United States Foreign Policy (New York : Columbia
University Press, 1952), p. 270.
Ine replies were illuminating, interesting, and informative, fhe
decline in public esteem of the department was cited, owing to the
irresponsible attacks of Senator McCarthy and others* young men and
women were reluctant to search for positions in which their loyalty to
the United States might be impugned in unwarranted attacks. Other replies
noted the discouragement produced by long oeiays in the selection process.
A lesser number mentioned the ease with which college graduates could
obtain appointments, without examination, in the Foreign Service Staff
Corps, the J>epartment's intern program, or in other federal agencies.
A large number noted that full employment and widespread prosperity
made diligent searching for employment by qualified college graduates







of Examiners to adopt an active and carefully organized recruiting
program in the colleges and universities of the nation.
"The obvious desirability for cultivating the main source of Foreign
Service Officers did
. . .
spur the department of State into issuing
a directive in March, 1951, announcing that an intensive recruitment
campaign for new officers would be launched at universities and colleges




and funds, representatives of the Board of Examiners met with faculty
embers of institutions solicited in regional conferences about the
country in order to acquaint them with the aims and needs of the Foreign
Service and to provide for a resident faculty representative on each
campus. Stringency of funds eliminated a projected new and attractive
brochure containing general information about the Foreign Service.
These efforts were crowned with only partial success in providing
a steady and adequate supply. Lowered standards utilized in 1951
(22.5 per cent passing instead of 20.1 per cent) provided only 84 eligible
for appointment. Of the 1,639 who were examined in 1952, only 94 were
appointed, when the Board of Examiners was calling for an annual intake
of 150-200 officers. The apparent lack of success was blamed primarily
on the inadequacy of the Board of Examiners -- too small to process the
large number of applications for lateral entry and so overburdened with
examining procedures that the program for further meetings with college
and university faculties had to be curtailed. Secondly, the "Foreign
Affairs Intern Program" continued to recruit college graduates in
24
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There are two different intern programs. The first provides an
opportunity of summer work in the Department to selected college
graduates who have been nominated by their university faculties. After
a summer of work in the Department, during which those selected are
exposed to some of the sundry daily tasks of foreign affairs, they are
encouraged to take the regular examination for FSO-S. Though the
Executive Director estimated that some 2 9 800 potential candiaates were
lost by the Board of Examiners to the intern program, it is submitted
that if they did not take examinations for appointment to FSO-8 after
their summer of work, then their interest in becoming members of the
Foreign Service was superficial and transitory — they would never have
developed into good officers, and the Department is better without them.
The second intern program, the Management Intern Program, is
designed to create a supply of administrative functionaries whose intent
is to remain in administration. Personnel entering this program take a
Federal Service Employees Examination and, if successful, enter the
Department in Grades GS-7 through GS-11, depending on their qualifications.
Their first two years, intern years, are probationary as is the case
with all Civil Service employees. There are presently twelve persons
in this program, which will end in January, 1955.
The Board of Examiners made plans to appoint some two hundred
candidates through examinations to be held in the fall of 1952 through
liberalizing age and language requirements. Unfortunately, the Board was
laboring in a vacuum — all appointments to Class VI ceased in August,
1952. Then recruitment responsibility was removed from the Board of
Examiners and delegated to a newly-created division of Recruitment. This
Division, given authority to conduct all recruitment for the Department of
State, established a College Relations Unit to continue to tap the obvious
source of personnel. However, this Division was absorbed as a branch of
the Office of Personnel as part of the general move to deemphasize recruit-
ment in accordance with the program of the new administration. The new
Republican administration had promised economy and reform to the electorate,
Thus a stringent economy drive produced a reduction in force program which,
coupled with a reappraisal of government security measures and an exami-







In the fall of 1953 over a thousand persons took the written
examination for Class VI V but only 108 names appeared on the Eligible
List. Of these, 4 had established eligibility in the 1949 examinations,
8 in the 1950 examinations, 24 in the 1951 examinations, and 72 in the
1952 examinations.
In 1951 the Foreign Service Officer Corps had a total strength of
1,390. This reached a peak strength of 1,427 in 1953 but fell to 1,285
through annual attrition in 1954. Attrition, in fact, exceeded by
55 per cent the total entry at the bottom. Instead of expanding to meet
increased responsibilities, the Foreign Service was growing smaller.
The >*riston Committee
The unhappy state of recruitment had become so desperate by early
1954 that even the most reactionary in the department conceded that some
remedy was required. The appointment by the Secretary of State of a
Public Committee on Personnel (known familiarly as the tfriston Committee
after the name of its chairman, the president of Brown University)
climaxed a decision to inquire into the administration of the Foreign
Service. The »riston Committee was requested to study and make recommen-
dations concerning the organization of the Service, the feasibility of
amalgamating Civil Service employees of the department of State with
the Foreign Service, personnel and administrative policy, restoration
of public confidence, and the morale of the Foreign Service.
Two months after it began its work, the tfriston Committee made its
report. The conservative recruitment policies which produced the lowest
numerical strength in the Foreign Service Officer Corps since 1948 were
sharply criticized; poor administration permitted the intake of officers
to fluctuate without due regard for real needs,
- 30 -
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The report noted that responsibilities had increased while size
decreased, necessitating immediate expansion. Because it was too late
to build through bottom intake, it was recommended that Civil Service
personnel of the Department of State be integrated to the greatest
extent possible. It was noted that about half of these personnel (in
Grades GS-7 or above) were in positions ranging from desk officer to
the highest levels of the Department. Only 119 Foreign Service officers,
staffing 2 per cent of the home desks, were on duty in the Department in
Washington.
It was emphasized that the Foreign Service must "open its ranks to
a large number of people with a high degree of specialization in other
25than the general practice of diplomacy.** Because the Foreign Service
25Quoted from "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," Report of the
Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel (Washington. 1954),
P. 14.
Reserve, organized to supply officers with such skills, had failed to
provide then, the ariston Committee recommended a solution of permitting
large numbers of Civil Service employees the "attractive" and "rewarding"
opportunity of transferring into the Foreign Service Officer Corps. The
Committee considered that the Foreign Service should be "geographically
representative, adequately reflective of the wide and essential variety
of American life, and sufficiently diversified in the technical skills
26




Service rapidly to an adequate size of about 3,900, the Committee









the Staff and Reserve Corps, as well as from the Civil Service, be
utilized.
Por future recruitment, the Committee reaffirmed the principle of
annual, competitive, nation-wide examination. However, the Board of
Examiners was castigated for "want of close and fruitful relationship





The Department of State was urged, by ririston Committee recommen-
dation, to establish a system of national, competitive scholarships
to provide a steady and adequate flow of excellent, varied, representative
personnel. This system would be patterned after the Navy*s successful
Contract Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program. The Committee
felt that this was the only method of insuring the five hunured personnel
required each year to support a Foreign Service trebled in size.
Action and Reaction
The energetic action of the Department of State in implementing
the recommendations of the triston Committee surprised most observers.
The Board of Examiners was directed to revise, modernize, liberalize,
and expedite examining and appointing procedures. The Secretary of State
further directed that legislative authority for the proposed scholarship
program be sought.
Draft legislation for the Proposed Foreign Service Scholarship
Training Program was completed in the early months of 1955. Seven
hundred and fifty scholarships of $900 each were to be awarded, under
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the basis of competitive examinations administered by the secretary of
State. It was estimated that this program would cost more than
*1, 600,000 each year of the operation.
Before submitting the legislation to Congress, the Bureau of the
Budget was given an opportunity to express its views. The Bureau of
the Budget did not endorse the proposed legislation, because there was
"grave doubt of State's ability to take into tht Service sufficient
trainees from the program to justify its cost, judging from past
28
recruitment history." It was also suggested that scholarship candidates
28Prom an unpublished memorandum of May 6, 1455, from the President's
Advisor on Personnel Management, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget.
would possess so great an advantage over others taking the examinations
for appointment that those appointed might become limited to persons
fortunate enough to have been selected for the scholarship program.
The Bureau of the Budget argued further that an undesirable political
coloration, even though remote, would be introduced into the appointment
procedure, and that a bad precedent would be set in establishing a
scholarship training program to satisfy the requirements for only one
relatively small segment of the civilian federal service. The inevita-
bility of military service would interrupt the constant flow of
scholarship personnel into the Foreign Service. Reconsideration of the
legislation was accordingly recommended to the Department of State.
As a result of the ariston Committee's recommendation that recruit-
ment be based upon closer relationships with the principal source of
candidates, some 233 colleges and universities were visited by teams of
Foreign Service officers. Future entrance through examination at the
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and faculties alike concerning the career opportunities afforded by the
Foreign Service. These efforts brought some 7,404 candidates to take
the written examinations of June and December, 1955, and 8,069 candidates
for the examinations of 1956. Of these candidates, some 588 were
appointed. The table on page 41 indicates the results of continuing
liaison with the colleges from 1957 through 1964.
Generally, these candidates have come from all parts of the United
States, though approximately one-third are from the Middle Atlantic States.
There has been a recent increase in personnel from the California area,
reflecting properly the population trends. In 1952, it was noted that
25 per cent of those Foreign Service officers a t pointed haa attended
Harvard, Princeton, or Vale. By 1956, the number appointed from these
universities had been reduced to 17 per cent, indicating the success of
the Department in diversifying and transfusing more of "main street"
29into the arteries of the Foreign Service." However, it must be
29
The high percentage of successful candidates from Harvard, Princeton,
and /ale, it may be surmised. Is also indicative of the higher academic
standards maintained by these universities. Owing to the large annual
number of applicants for admission to these universities, they need only
admit those whose academic abilities have been amply demonstrated in the
high schools and preparatory schools. Attrition within these universities
further screens out those unable to maintain their scholarly achieve-
ments at a high level. For this reason, then, the candidates from Harvard,
Princeton, and Yale are an academic elite whose chances of successfully
passing both written and oral Foreign Service examinations are immeasurably
greater than candidates from other universities whose academic standards
are not so high. Yet, as of December 1, 1963, it was determined that
Foreign Service officers had received their undergraduate degrees from
412 colleges and universities in the United States and il foreign
universities. See United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Administration of National security . Hearings before the
Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, SSth Congress,
1st Session, November 21, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office,
1963), part IV, pp. 345-349 for a list of those universities involved.
remembered that the Foreign Service is not a congress and does not seek







larger and more representative service should never be allowed to
overshadow the need for high quality.
It has been charged that the recruitment program and the promotion
progran favored Ivy League or white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, This
charge has been partially answered in the preceding paragraph. The
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, the Honorable
William J. Crockett, in testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee,
further refuted the charge.
For instance, it is one of our continuing problems
that the very toughness of the Foreign Service entrance
examination excludes many Negro candidates. -*t have
virtually no successful candidates from southern Negro
colleges simply because their training in these colleges
has not been oriented toward successfully preparing for the
entrance examinations. So although there was no overt
intention to do this, sometimes our standards or the
application of our standards caused this.
30
Ibid., p. 296.
A Ford Foundation project, partially administered by the Uepartraent,
will select some twenty-five students from various colleges, principally
Negroes, and provide them with two summers of work in the department and
graduate training at selected graduate schools in foreign affairs,
economics, or public administration. On completion of their graduate
year, these students will take the examination for entrance at the
PSO-8 level.
d Porcign Service Academy?
Though the scholarship program was quietly aborted, the much-
discussed Foreign Service Academy scheme, first considered by the 82nd
Congress, is still bruited about. H. R. 1870, introduced in the 83rd
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of junior Foreign Service officers. Its students, selected by national
competitive examination, were to receive the same pay and allowances
as cadets at the United States military Academy. Neither this bill,
its predecessor in the 82nd Congress, nor successors in the 34th through
87th Congresses, received much serious consideration because of a fear,
both within and outside of the Foreign Service, that such an academy
would eliminate diversity in the Service by tending to force its students
into a single mold and to breed a caste spirit. The Honorable Lincoln
Gordon, Q« S. Ambassador to Brazil, in testimony before the Jackson
Subcommittee, indicated that "drawing junior recruits of the service
from the whole range of American colleges and universities, ana from
many graduate schools as well, provides a far broader base ana much
better prospects of highly qualified entrants into the career. *
31United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security . Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session,
Itecetnber 11, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1964), part V,
p. 376.
Further, the decision to seek a career in the Foreign service would be
undesirably pushed back to the high school level, at which stage it
would be most difficult to judge the qualities of the applicants. 32
32
•^Imagine the initial uniform outfit for each budding diplomat!
For example;
Coat, morning (cutaway) each 1
Trousers, striped, diplomat's pair 1
Ties, silk, striped, old school each 3
Spats, gray, w/pearl buttons pair 2
Portfolio, leather, black, brass mounted, w/lock each 1
Suit, flannel, oxford gray, sincere, winter, each 3
business

















Suit, dacron, cord, striped, brown, sincere, each 3
summer
Etc.
See Zara S. Steiner, Present Problems of the Foreign Service
(Princeton University; March 20, 1961), p. 43, for more discussion on
an undergraduate Foreign Service Academy.
The latest guise of the Foreign Service Academy scheme, S. 865 of
the 88th Congress, for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs College
at the graduate level, was given more earnest consideration; because
it was suggested by the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, known
more commonly as the Herter Committee. T*is group of private citizens,
most of whom had been previously involved professionally in foreign
affairs, was constituted late in 1961 at the request of Secretary Rusk.
It wa.s established under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and drew its financial support from the Ford
Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, thus giving its findings
some semblance of independence and impartiality. Former Secretary of
State Christian A. Herter was chairman of the twelve-nan group which
included forner ambassadors John Hay Whitney and George V. Allen. The
Committee focused its attention on the personnel problems of the t>epart-
ment of State, A. I. aJ., and U. S. I. A.
As outlined in S. 865, the College would consist of two main
operating divisions — one for instruction and the other for research.
The instructional division would assume and enlarge upon the activities
of the existing Foreign Service Institute other than consular, visa,
and immigration instruction. Curricula woulc include language instruction,
area studies, orientation of new officers whose substantive work would
be in the field of foreign affairs, orientation of government officers
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courses similar to the existing nidcareer and senior officer courses.
It is considered that this instruction could be performed adequately
by the existing Foreign Service Institute provided with additional
funds for an enlarged student body and curriculum.
The real justification for the Academy, according to its proponents,
lies in the proposed character of the research division. The Herter
Committee hopefully describes the Academy as "a graduate-type institution,"
autonomous, "new and unique,'* and "topnotch." This is a government enter-
prise which is to tnjoy "freedom of inquiry" and "the advantages of the
traditional academic environment" along with access to official secrets.




Personnel For the New Diplomacy (Report of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs Personnel. Washington: Judc & Jetweiler, Inc., 1962),
pp. 103-111.
Admittedly, training is important; but intellectual improvement
does not necessarily presage improvement in the management of complex
foreign affairs. The Honorable t>ean Acheson, commenting on S. tfo5 in
a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, stated, ".Not knowledge alone,
but how it is marshaled by will and brought to bear in action, must
remain the determining consideration in the conduct of foreign policy."
34United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 8Sth Congress, 1st Session,
i>ece«ber 11, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1964), part V,
P. 379.
Able individuals will, no doubt, benefit from the academic instruction





contacts with problems are not likely to receive such qualities in the
course of lectures. Lectures cannot equip personnel to handle crises.
Many advocates of the project are fond of citing the 12 per cent
of the armed forces officer's career spent in training and comparing
it with the Foreign Service officer's 5 per cent. Such a comparison
is not analgous, and the percentage of tine which military officers
spend in training is certainly greater than 12 per cent. Excepting
for brief periods of war, the military establishment is continually in
training for war. It is a force in being which is brought to bear
through the consciousness of its potential rather than actual employ-
ment. The foreign policy establishment, on the contrary, is operating
in its fullest sense at all times, especially in peace.
Assuming that "the best of American minds" could be attracted,
is it logical to assume that any administration would permit this faculty
free and unhampered public scope to criticize or question the policies
being pursued? Further, since the proposed bill does not include
re levent terms of tenure, academic freedom cannot exist. Political
control, despite pious utterances to the contrary, is implicit in a lack
of professional tenure — the College Chancellors, the Board of Regents,
and the financial support would be subject to the vagaries of such
control.
In view of the foregoing, how is it proposed to attract a faculty
with "that rare mixture of high academic standards and rich exposure
to the practical world of foreign affairs" ~ raen which the Herter
Coamittee admits are in short supply? Such men already have tenure in









A wiser and more economical course would be to continue training
in the Foreign Service Institute and the service war colleges, none of
which have problems that more generous budgets could not resolve.
Finally, existing colleges and universities already offer excellent
facilities for advanced international studies and research. Tuition
grants for officer students and contributions to such institutions for
increased expenses would make instruction and research available to
35Poreign Service officers under conditions of real academic freedom.
35For nore discussion on the Poreign Service Academy, see Lllis 0.
Briggs, "Case Against a *.<est Point* for diplomats," The New York Times
.Magazine
.
Nay 3, 1964, p;>. 20, 60, 62, and 64. See also Briggs, "Let's




Results of Examinations for Appointment to FS0-8
Examination No. of No. No. Passed No. Passed No. Certified/
Year Applicants i-xamined written Oral Appointed
1957 (June) 4,385 2,616 556 80* 46**
1957 (yec.) 6,094 3,959 676 87* 26**
1958 *** *** *** *** ***
1959 10,112 6,470 1,311 342 227
1960 8,015 5,230 1,469 1,469 365
1961 6,066 3,815 1,068 226 140
1962 4,465 2,773 1,079 268 121
1963 8,127 5,325 952 168 4
1964 4,671 2,792 405 4*
The annual number of applicants for appointment to PSQ-S shown
in the table above is indicative of the continuing liaison *itk the
colleges and universities and the fiscal ability to sustain this
program. The number of candidates successfully completing both written
and oral examinations reflects efforts to resolve conflicting needs
of the Service with the stringent academic standards. The number
certified/appointed is reflective of funds available to augment the
Poreign Service. The above figures do not indicate the number of
candidates withdrawing before oral examinations, or the number with-
drawing after oral examinations, or those otherwise disqualified after
oral examinations.
* 15 candidates were deferred pending a second oral examination
from the June, 1957, group ana 13 froai the December, 1£57, group. Final
disposition of these candidates was not available.
** 18 candidates were pending appointment from the June, 1957,
group and 54 from the December, 1957, group, rinal disposition of
ttiese personnel was not available, but it is safe to assume that they
were appointed unless they withdrew of their own accor^.
*** No examinations were given in this year.
• These figures are incomplete because oral examinations are


















Traditionally, the Foreign Service has sought men with general
experience who are readily adaptable to all kinds of work but not
particularly expert in any one field. Their ideal applicant for the
bottom grade is between twenty and thirty years old, preferably under
twenty-six, with a bachelor's degree. He should be able to read the
English language with clear understanding and to write it with clarity
and precision. The candidate should also be able to read reasonably
well in either French, German, Spanish, or Russian; possess an
elementary knowledge of economics; and have a general knowledge of
American history.
The Examination
As given prior to 1955, the written examinations lasted over a
period of three and a half days. It was designed, in its emphasis upon
the formal aspects of learning, to test the quality and breadth of mind
of the recent college graduate with a background in liberal arts. The
examination also gave some advantage to candidates whose education
extended beyond the undergraduate level.
The written examination was composed of four general examinations
and three special examinations covering reading and comprehension,







expression, world history and government, principles of economics, and
languages. Those candidates successful in the written examinations
passed on to an equally formidable oral examination administered by
a panel of five Deputy Examiners. These -Deputy Examiners, experienced
in and out of government in the field of personnel and management, would
probe for more than a half hour such characteristics as poise, facility
and precision of expression, forcefulness, knowledge of the United
States, and adaptability for the Foreign Service.
Formerly given only in Washington, the oral examination tended to
favor those candidates who could afford the speculative outlays of money
which would be required of those residing any distance from the capital.
The written examinations utilized since 1955 have been prepared by
the Educational Testing Service at Princeton, New Jersey. These are
composed of four parts; a ninety-minute test in English expression*
a ninety-minute test in statistical analysis; a two-hour test, half of
which relates to social studies and half to humanities and natural science;
and, finally, an hour test in French, German, Spanish, or Russian.
Critics of the new examination, which is now given in 69 U. S. cities
and 110 posts abroad, point out that there is no test of the candidate's
ability to write a prose composition. Multiple-choice questions have
replaced essay questions. Considering the needs of the Foreign Service,
this is indeed a glaring omission, and considerable pressure has been
exerted on the Department to return to the essay form. The hour test in
modern languages has been made optional. Less than 2 per cent of those
taking the examination now attempt the language examination, and only
half of these pass it satisfactorily. Formal training in international











background is essential to successful competition. No rewards accrue
to candidates with additional training in fields that are particularly
germane to foreign affairs. Finally, the very brevity is indicative
of the reduction in scope.
Even the oral examination1 has been liberalized. In lieu of the
*It is now given in 23 U. S. cities and 15 foreign cities.
formidable five, a thorough three conversationally scrutinizes the facets
of the candidate's personality for character defects that might inhibit
effectiveness in the Foreign Service. However, despite apparent
liberalization, approximately half of the candidates successful in the
written examinations are eliminated in this screening process, which
normally lasts an hour and a half.
Having vaulted the hurdle of written examination, satisfied loyalty
scrutineers of a lack of subversive tendencies, and disposed the oral
inquistors to place his name on the Eligible List, some initial training
remains to be completed prior to assignment within the department, or
as third assistant MflunkyH in a large embassy, or in a more important
position such as vice-consul in an "important" location such as Vigo.
To this end the Foreign Service Institute was established.
The Foreign Service Institute
The department of State had for many years, particularly after the
passage of the Rogers Act of 1924, carried on a program of limited
training for Foreign Service officers who had just been admitted to the
Service. In pre-tforld #ar II days, such training was carried out on an













being snail. Being mindful of the vastly increasing role of the United
States in international politics and anticipating an increasing number
of new personnel requiring orientation courses prior to assignment,
provision was made for the establishment of the Foreign Service Institute
in the draft legislation which became the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
Its precursor, the division of Training Service, had been established
by a departmental order of April 7, 1945, in expectation of training a
large group of armed forces veterans. This division provided basic
orientation for junior officers ana advanced courses for Foreign Service
officers of middle grades in preparation for higher administrative
and fiscal duties. Specialized training at selected colleges, univer-
sities, and technical schools was an essential part of this program.
The Basic Oourse
The Poreign Service Institute, which finally commenced operations
on March 13, 1947, initially offered a nine- to twelve-week (now three
months) basic officer-training course to acquaint the young officer with
the requirements and functions of the Foreign Service. Lectures, con-
ferences, and practice work are utilized, covering all phases of Foreign
Service operations. Some effort is presently expended in acquainting
the students with the activities of other government agencies participating
in the field of foreign affairs. A few lectures introduce them to soae
of the basic philosophical and political concepts involved in inter-
national politics. The last four weeks of the course are applied to
training for consular operations.
Degeneration
Before the curriculum was fully devised to provide for advanced








low esteem. The appropriations for its operation have been too snail
from its inception, representing usually about 1$ per cent of the
Department's budget. Whenever the fiscal pinch is felt elsewhere in
the Department, funds from the Institute are among the first to be
diverted to ease that pinch. This restricts, necessarily, the quantity
and/or quality of faculty that can be attracted to supervise and instruct.
The Institute was, and is, primarily staffed with Foreign Service officers,
some with only limited educational experience. For these reasons,
"when the Wriston Committee commenced its work in April, 1954,
it was calculated that 28.8 per cent of all Foreign Service officers
had earned an M. A. degree or its equivalent; 4,6 per cent held a Ph. o.
degree* and 25.1 per cent had done graduate work without receiving a
degree. See James L. McCamy and Alessandro Corradini, "The People of
the State Department and Foreign Service," American Political science
Review
.
XLVII I (December, 1954), p. 1076. tfet supervisors were, and
still are, reluctant to free better officers for duties at the Institute.
academia generally cast a jaundiced eye at the budding institute, which
became tolerant amusement and then disdain, as government economies
caused it to degenerate into a secretarial school to teach typists the
difference between Kleenex and diplomatic notes.
Reconstruction
The Institute was revitalized in the repercussion stemming from the
Wriston Report. It is still primarily staffed by Foreign Service officers
who will serve in this capacity for only two or three years and then
leave the Institute for other duty. The bulk of the teaching is now
done by language tutors working on a contract basis, government employees
who volunteer their services, and guest professors who give one or two
lectures. The library was, and is still, snail, supposedly harnessed
to the courses of instruction offered, but in my personal opinion, it
does not suffice. Like so many other institutes of higher learning in
- 46 -












the metropolitan Washington area, personnel are expected to rely on the
resources of the Library of Congress. The competition for books there
and the bureaucratic red tape involved in utilizing its books off the
premises are too well known to be delineated here.
fhe Mid-Career Course
The Foreign Service Institute also provides a mid-career course
for selected officers from Classes IV, V, and VI; senior seminars for
Classes VII and above; and specialized training in languages, area
studies, economics, and similar fields which become allied with policy
more and more with the passage of time.
rhe nine-month mid-career course proposes to acquaint students with
conceptual theories which may help reporting officers in diagnosing
social behavior and to review domestic influences significantly affecting
U. 5. policy formulation. Though aimed at providing the officer with a
broader frame of reference than can be acquired in the field, many
diplomats believe that the arts of diplomacy are best learned in the
field. This prejudice has not been completely overcoae. In the course,
a brief introduction is given to
:
... current theories of social behavior; the agencies,
departments, and private interests participating in the
field of foreign relations* the domestic values and attitudes
underlying American policy; and life in Russia and Communist
China. It concludes with a period of studies on good
administration and executive practices. °
3Zara S. Steiner, Present Problems of the Foreign Service (Princeton
University; March 20, 1961), p. 42.
How
The entire course conveys an impression of haste and superficiality.
much can be retained from a lecture or two on epistentology, cultural
anthropology, or legal-normative theory? lixperts in these fields can
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In the fields of functional and specialized training, priority
has been given to language instruction, particularly French, German,
and Spanish, It was noted that sonc 50 per cent of all officers
lacked a useful knowledge of any foreign tongue in 1958. In addition
to the major languages, intensive instruction is being given in exotic
languages in recognition of a growing interest in and increasing contacts
with Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This language study forms the
base of three major area specialization programs, some of which are
conducted in universities. Other personnel pursue training in the more
common areas of Western Europe and Latin America. Under ideal conditions,
the officer becomes a linguistic, geographical, ana political expert in
the area studied.
A few officers receive training for specialization in economic
affairs -- trade, finance, investment, labor, aviation, and economic
development, for example* others specialize in international organization,
where the knowledge of the historian and the qualities of a technical
expert, political analyst, and extemporaneous debater are necessary.
The Senior Seminar
The Senior Seminars began in 1959. Usually, some twenty persons,
half of whom are brought from outside of the Foreign Service, probe a
wide variety of subjects but none in depth. The emphasis is on
briefings, lectures, and discussions led by "visiting firemen." The
result is the sarae superficiality found in the mid-career course. There
is no time spent in concentrating on one or two problems of international
politics which may become crucial to U. S. policy in the next decade.
The concentration on one problem relevant to future U. s>. policy would
provide a more fruitful method of conducting this seminar.
* 48 -










Training in department of defense Establishments
Usually about thirty more senior officers are assigned to one
of the defense colleges annually for training. The majority attend
the National War College, a smaller number attend the Naval War College,
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Air University. An
even smaller number attend the Imperial i>efense College or the NATO
Defense College. The attendance of Poreign Service officers in these
institutions is not predicated upon concentrated research in some area
of international politics, but rather to provide them with new contacts
and ideas which may become applicable in the international area. Another
unadvertised facet of this program is to give Foreign service officers an
appreciation of what the military can do for them, and vice versa. Such
A
knowledge should be available to senior diplomats who may be required to
Military attaches are occasionally asked to provide this type of
advice to their ambassadors. Though these officers were primarily
assigned for intelligence and representation functions, the country team
concept has given a larger scope to their activities. The ultimate scope
of their activities is, of course, dependent on the wishes of tbe
ambassador.
make a decision affecting the deployment of large military forces. There
was a time in the not-too-distant past when the Foreign Service and
military establishment viewed each other with a mutual, veiled suspicion.
This program has engendered a considerable alleviation of this problem.
Re coercenations Concerning the Institute
It should be obvious from the foregoing that if the Foreign Service
Institute is to be maintained to perform those functions which serve as
a rationale for its existence, its permanent staff should be enlarged,
both fro* the ranks of experienced Foreign Service officers and from













instructors for one or two lectures is, at best, a stopgap Measure,
vhile experts should be invited to lead seminars or give courses, a
permanent staff is required to develop an adequate training program.
A tour of duty on the Institute staff should have the same attractiveness
for a Foreign Service officer that a tour of duty at Annapolis has for
a naval officer. To accomplish the requisite enhancement of prestige,
the Institute should be guaranteed of adequate funds, despite the whins
of economy-minded Congresses or penny-pinching Department administrators,
in order to pay salaries attractive to the best academicians.
Many, however, feel that the Foreign Service Institute can, at
best, only duplicate the facilities of a good university in terms of
books, courses, and professors. It is considered that the facilities of
the five or six graduate schools now developing programs in international
relations could hardly be matched. Yet such graduate schools do not
operate at the convenience of the Department of State and are notoriously
"sticky" about applications being made many months in advance. Finally,
there is little agreement among the faculties of these universities as
to what courses should be pursued in advanced studies of international
relations. Those academic lines of investigation pursued may or nay
not fit specific present or predicted needs of the Department. These
problems, however, are relatively minor — problems which could be
fruitfully resolved by close liaison between those universities conducting
studies in international relations and the Department.
experience
Many observers feel that the government is suffering from an over-












benefits to be derived t herefrom. Assuming a good educational foundation,
experience is always the best teacher for the Foreign Service officer.
"On the job training and experience are likely to be more educational
... than a year at an educational institution."
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
The Secretary of State , Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 12.
This is not intended to denigrate the value of formal educational
processes, but rather to place the benefits of such processes in their
proper perspective. An opportunity to catch up with advances in
specialized fields or to become acquainted with research in new fields
will be useful to some officers. However, "for training related to
government requirements, better use can be made of interagency job













A number of administrative surveys begun by the Career Development
and Counseling Section of the Personnel Office, in the spirit of the
tfriston Report, have not yet been completed. "According to many reports,
present staffing patterns are a strange mixture of personal influence,
regional rivalries, area proximity, and budgetary considerations." It
Zara S. Steiner, The State department ana the Foreign Service
.
The ririston Report — Four rears Later (Princeton University, March 26,
1958), p. 37.
is almost inconceivable that no current inventory of overseas positions
and officer skills is maintained. Though the Department has been
developing what may be "the most advanced conceptual approach (to a
career development program) of any civilian agency of the Federal
2Government," its impact on operational decisions has been negligible.
2
Personnel For the New Diplomacy (Report of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs Personnel. Washington. Jucid k Detweiler, Inc., 1962),
p. 83.
The Career Development and Planning Section lacks manpower information
on which to base its career planning recommendations. Created to
synchronize the development of specialists ana generalists with
commensurate demand, the program has not been coordinated with recruit-
ment and promotion — hence its failure to exert any significant in-
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"the needs of the service," but how can a career be planned if career
patterns designed to broaden experience and develop personnel for
greater responsibility are ignored?
The Herter Committee has indicated that the Career development
and Planning Section staff has been too small and uneven in quality
3




that the Department obtain "highly qualified professionals in the
field of personnel" to staff this unit. In plain English, the Herter
Committee suggests creating an empire of career ^evelopers and personnel
planners. Concerning the contribution which such experts can make to
the Department, Ellis 0. Briggs has commented:
Another foolishness fed by the State Department to the
colleges is the proposition that "Management Equals Diplomacy."
This reflects the truly astonishing proliferation both within
the Department and in its offices abroad of souped-up
administrative types who inflate themselves with all sorts of
rich and resonant titles like Career ^valuators. General
Services Specialists, and even Ministers of Embassy for
Administrative Affairs. These glorified janitors, supply
clerks, and pants pressors yearn to get their fingers in the
foreign affairs pie, and when they do, the diplomatic furniture
often gets marked with gummy thumbprints.
4ETlis G. Briggs, "Case Against a »«est Point* for Diplomats," The
New York Times Magazine . May 3, 1964, p. 20. Mr. Briggs, a retired
"
career ambassador, testified before the Jackson Subcommittee on the
marked improvement of administration of the U. S. Embassy in Prague after
the communist government of Czechoslovakia declared 66 of his 78 personnel
persona non grata in hopes of dealing him a painful blow. He had, prior
to the communist coup, been waging an administrative battle with the
Department to reduce his staff by 50 per cent. See United States
Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of
National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security
Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, June 14 and 17, 1963

















Admittedly, there is a complexity in planning a personnel program
which will satisfy present needs and prepare for projected future
requirements. However, I feel that professional personnel planners
and career evaluators are unnecessary. Foreign Service officers, by
virtue of a wide variety of experience, ranging from quadruple-entry
bookkeeping to the anthropology of Southeast Asia, can best administer
the needs of their own service with a small and efficient staff. The
problems are of no greater complexity. The assignment of foreign
Service officers to personnel duties in the Apartment should be viewed
in the same light in which naval officers perceive a tour of auty in
the Bureau of Naval Personnel — rewarding and career-enhancing.
Finally, the need for coordination is obvious. Administrative
surveys should be expedited, and the resultant planning should be
coordinated with recruitment and promotion. #ith all of their experience
in coordination with other executive agencies, it seems paradoxical
that there is an uncoordinated area within the itepartraent itself.
Lack of Career Patterns
It is presently obvious that if a man is to sake his career in the
Foreign Service, he must avoid specialization at ail costs. Personnel
often desperately needed in Washington for their specialized Knowledge
are rotated to overseas duties because their superiors feel that post-
ponement of foreign tours may hurt future promotion chances.
Generalises and Specialists
The relative merits of the employment of specialists or generalists
in positions of high responsibility is a subject of much sterile debate.
- 54 -
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Obviously the State department has need of both — generalists of good
judgement and specialists in law, economics, intelligence, etc.
As seen by the Jackson Subcommittee, "a generalist is a specialist
who has widened his interests and sacrificed extreme specialization,
with its rewards, for assignments presenting broader challenges, and
the rewards associated with work covering much or all of the range of
foreign policy. Thus a generalist should possess specialized cora-
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
fhe Secretary of State, Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 83th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;
Government Printing Office, 1964), p, 10,
petence in some field of related endeavour. This would create an
awareness of the limitations of specialization in areas of complexity.
Specialization, properly applied, does not conflict with the development




Many have considered that the tfriston Report does grave injustice
to the role of the generalist. tfhile it is true that overseas programs
cannot be administered without men expert in technical skills, ultimate
policies must still be determined by generalists — men of broad back-
ground, training, and vision. The political staff, the men who serve
successively in a number of countries and deal with a wide variety of
problems, remains the spinal column of the Poreign Service, to which
the specialists are appendages. Yet the traditional preparation of a
- 55 -
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diplomat has been too narrow. He has too often deprecated the importance
of economic anc social factors and viewed information (propaganda)
programs with a jaundiced and suspicious eye. But the future head of
a diplomatic mission is responsible for every aspect of its work and
must coordinate the activities of the specialized members of his staff.
He therefore needs a sympathetic knowledge and understanding of the
non-political aspects of his mission and a wisdom to utilize the
expertise at his beck and call.
With the preparation for posts of responsibility in the future in
mind, the department tries to assign the junior officers to positions
where they will be introduced to the skills of the economic and commercial
officer, the intelligence expert, and the public affairs specialist.
In the course of his career, the Foreign Service officer may become
expert in a geographical area, fie should continue to be given jobs
which are related to his past geographic experiences or which will
prepare him for more responsible planning and coordinating activities.
Economic Specialists
The highest rewards in the Foreign Service are given to officers
performing political work. Pew commercial or economic specialists
ever become consul generals or chiefs of diplomatic mission. Vet
most economic negotiations are conducted on a multi-lateral basis,
requiring the presence of a large number of economic experts. If the
American case is to be adequately presented, men with broad economic
training and experience who are able to deal with a wide variety of
problems, and technicians possessing specialized knowledge in commodities,
international finance, or world trade, must be available. The problem











one because of intense competition for those trained in this field.
The State Department and Foreign Service can offer only poor induce-
aents compared to industry.
Intelligence and Research Specialists
There is strong feeling in the department that the Intelligence and
Research Offices engage in academic exercises with little immediate
application to the other regional and functional offices. "One Foreign
Service officer warned that it was considered a 'graveyard' for aspiring
n
diplomats and was to be avoided at all costs." Research and analysis
7Steiner, The State Department and the Foreign Service
.
The Wriston
Report ~ Four Years Later
, p. 39.
require background material and experience that can only be biilt up over
a long period of time. It takes time to train a man accustomed to opera-
tional work to prepare a background paper or an intelligence estimate.
Subtleties of discrimination are required, which come only after years of
practice, in order to utilize available sources effectively. Obviously,
the Foreign Service officer just returned from a tour of duty in Lastern
turope may not, therefore, be an equal of the man who has studied Eastern
European affairs over a long period of time. The incoming officer serves
in this office for only three years; but he can, in that period, learn to
appreciate the need for accurate reporting from the field and learn some
of the niceties connected with this type of reporting for future assignments,
Attracting the specialist without doing injury to the career of the
generalist seems to be an unresolved problem at the present time. I
personally consider that the Personnel Office would benefit by studying
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A Recommended Staff Corps
Specialists specialize, but generalists become ambassadors. This
belief has encouraged disdain for activities in fields other than
political reporting — the new activities which developed during and
after the second riorld War. However, according to deputy Under
Secretary of State for Administration, the Honorable William J. Crockett,
the department is "implementing ... a personnel system that recognizes
and encourages the role of specialization in the Foreign Service, that
establishes a number of clearly defined management fields, and that
offers a tailored career development program for each Foreign Service
officer." 8
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 66th Congress, 1st Session,
November 21, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1963), part IV,
p. 273.
Looking at this problem from a point of view narrowed by some
twenty-two years of naval service, it seems logical to establish a
regular staff corps within the Foreign Service —» a staff corps organized
and administered in the same manner in which the Naval Supply Corps,
Medical Corps, or Corps of Civil Engineers is managed. Such a corps
should include economic specialists, intelligence and research specialists,
public affairs specialists, etc. There is no apparent reason why such
personnel could not also aspire to the grade of career ambassador and
become, as senior fiscal or cultural officer, the Assistant Secretary
for Economic Affairs or Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural
Affairs. Fiscal officers, for example, could perform a dual function;
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performing the tasks assigned to economic advisors in a diplomatic
mission. In addition to becoming versed in disbursing, an economic
specialist should specialize, in depth, in world trade, international
finance, commodities, labor, or economic development. Prom this same
corps, personnel to operate the Agency for International development
should be obtained. The Educational and Cultural Affairs specialists
could be utilized to operate the U, S. Information Agency.
A sanple career for an economic staff corps officer who specializes
in labor during his graduate studies tour is shown on page 61.
Administration
There is a tendency in the apartment, which also permeates the
Foreign Service, to deprecate the Bureau of administration anu its
personnel. It seems logical to me to assume that administrative training
should be afforded to all Foreign Service officers, staff or line, as
a prerequisite to sore responsible positions. In considering the career
of a naval officer aspiring to command, a normal preparatory tour for
the responsibility of command is a tour as an executive officer — the
chief administrator of a command, who executes the captain's policies.
In a like manner, I envisage Foreign Service officers receiving training
first as administrative assistants and then as "executive officers" of
a diplomatic mission. On becoming chief of a diplomatic mission, the
Foreign Service officer will have had sufficient administrative
preparation to enable him to promulgate administrative policies which






The foregoing suggestions are indicative of what could be done
to develop multiple career patterns to meet the different needs of
the Department of State. I do not agree with i>eputy Under Secretary
~rGCkett*s remarks concerning devising a separately tailored career
program for each Foreign Service officer. This, it seems to me, is
an absurdity which overlooks one basic fact — the individual is
subject to the needs of the Department and not vice versa. The
Department does not exist to cater to individuals*
The suggested career patterns form only a nucleus of the varied
career patterns which might be developed by a personnel office
administered by and for Foreign Service officers. Xhe establishment of
a staff corps should not, however, preclude the assignment of generalists
to tours of duty in specialist areas for purposes of broadening their
experience and developing an appreciation of the specialized areas. Nor
should the specialists who broaden their competence be precluded from
becoming generalists and ambassadors. Diplomacy is essentially a
personal thing, and the man who excels in one area, usually after study





A RECOMMENDED CAREER PATTERN FOR AN ECONOMICS
SPECIALIST ~ LABOR — IN THE DEPARTMENT OP SrAIL
Assignment Grade
Orientation
Disbursing Officer and Second Assistant Economic FSO-S
Advisor ~ Large Embassy
Hone Tour in the Bureau of Economic Affairs FSO-7
or in the Department of Commerce or Labor
Economic Advisor, Labor — Small Embassy FSO-6
Graduate Studies in Labor and Its International Aspects FSO-5
Acquire M. A. degree. Selected personnel remain
for Ph. D. degree.
Economic Advisor, Labor — Large Embassy FSO-4
Tour in the Bureau of Economic Affairs FSO-3
or in the Department of Labor
Member of U. S. Delegation to I. L. 0. or E. E. C. FSO-2
Chief, U. S. Delegation to I. L. O. FSO-1
or Assistant Chief, Bureau of Economic Affairs
Chief, Bureau of Economic Affairs CAREER MINISTER/CAREER AMBASSADOR
The predicted length of tours, in most cases, will vary from 3 to 4
years, 3$ years being average.
The total length of the career indicated here is 30 years.
The above career can, of course, have as many variations as
sub-special! ties.
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CHAPTER VI
DECISION MAKING AND BB OFFICl
In the preceding chapters, the nexus of national security policy
and foreign policy was described. Following this, the historical
development of the position of the country desk officer from inception
to his present status was delineated. The recruitment of country desk
officers, or more specifically, the Foreign Service officers who become
country desk officers, was discussed, along with their subsequent
training and career development. Having examined these facets to gain
an insight into the environment and character of the desk officer, this
chapter will describe what he does and how he does it.
The Desk Officer — tfhere He Is How
As a result of successive attempts to meet complex country problems
with complex organisational answers, the country desk officer has been
relegated to a role bearing little resemblance to his conceived purpose.
With a few notable exceptions, what he does today is to serve as a con-
tact point for overseas posts, prepare first drafts and initial recommen-
dations, store information, and try to keep abreast of the activities
of colleagues on his level in other agencies. As seen by the Office of
Management of the Department, he does not provide leadership in policy
formulation, coordination, or decision making. Yet Robert Elder says
Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action














of the country desk officer, "tfith a considerable degree of truth, it
may be said of him that he is both wheelhorse and sparkplug of the




sent, with a reorganizational "axe to grind" and a modicum of contempt
b red from close familiarity, might tend to deprecate the importance of
the desk officer. Conversely, Mr. i-lder may have been overly impressed
with the importance-laden atmosphere which seems to prevail in most
government bureaus.
It may be asserted with a measure of truth that the successive
reorganizational efforts which have led to the diminution of the country
desk officer* s role have not produced compensating improvements in the
policy making and action-capacity of the regional bureaus. The hierarchy
above him has proliferated in complexity as he has worked at the same
tasks. A Deputy Office Director, Office Director, and a Deputy Assistant
Secretary separate him from regular contact with the Assistant Secretary.
Consultation with the Secretary has been nearly eliminated by the
existence of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and his deputy.
In any event, the Secretary has become much too busy to see desk officers.
Layering
The bureau structure has become complicated and confusing. A series
of layers between the Secretary and the desk officer delays action and
compounds reviews — a rigidity wasteful of manpower. Responsibility
for action, taken or consciously postponed, is so widely diffused below
the Assistant Secretary level that accountability is uncertain. Secretary
Rusk was particularly illuminating on the detriments of layering in
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his testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee. Terming it a principal
problem, he stated.
For example, when I read a telegram coming in in the
morning, it poses a very specific question, and the moment
I read it, X know myself what the answer must be. But that
telegram goes on its appointed course into the Bureau, ai^~
through the office and down to the desk. If it doesn't go
down there, somebody feels he is being deprived of his
participation in a matter of his responsibility.
Then it goes from the action offices back up through
the Department tone a week or 10 days later, and if it
isn't the answer that I knew had to be the answer, then I
change it at that point, having taken into account the
advice that came from below. But usually it is the answer
that everybody would know has to be the answer.
3United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, SSth Congress, 1st Session,
December 11, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 398.
Delegation of Authority
Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk admits that of the 1,300 incoming
cables, he sees only 20 to 30 in his course of daily business; and of
the 1,000 outgoing cables, he sees only 6. This indicates that there is
extensive delegation of authority down to the level of the desk officer.
This thought is further reinforced by secretary Rusk's comment that,
"Junior officers in the Department today deal with and have to deal with
matters which before World War II would have come to the Secretary of
A
State.H Thus the desk officer is the key State Department post in
4
Ibid., p. 388.
bilateral relations with other countries. He is the man that broods
24 hours a day about the problems confronting the United States with


















can alert the Assistant Secretary to festering problems, to action
which may prevent problems, or to existing opportunities where, by
early attention, U. S. interests can be sustained and promoted.
Myth of His Hole in Major Policy decisions
As a maker of major policy and important decisions, the desk
officer's role is a myth, existing only in the minds of those who have
little or no direct dealings with him. He serves as a junior contributor
to policy and decision making but has no authority to sign off on other
than routine matters. In reality, the country desk officer is a raid-
career Foreign Service officer who may or may not have served a tour of
duty in his country or area. He keeps track of all aspects of U. S.
relations with the country, sees that the U. S. Ambassador and the
Diplomatic Mission get the information and support they need to do their
jobs, provides coordination among middle-level colleagues in foreign
affairs agencies when the Department has action responsibility, serves
as the main communication channel between the Department and the U. S.
Embassy, and provides a starting point for those seeking action or
information concerning U. S. relations with the country.
6_ Typical Country Desk Officer
Probably there is no such thing as a typical country desk officer,
but some generalizations can be made about them without distortion.
They are college-trained, coming from some 412 American colleges and
universities and some 31 foreign universities as of December 1, 1963.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security . Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session,









They are usually in their late thirties or early forties, possessing
verbal skill, initiative, and responsibility. Varied tours of duty
have rendered them more adaptable, making then equally at hone at a New
England clambake or an embassy row cocktail party.
Steppings tones
Foreign Service officers view the country desk as a coveted
assignment, ample compensation for tours of duty in lonely outposts.
This is not indicative that a Washington tour is particularly desirable,
especially when considering the living expenses of such a tour. The
desk is a steppingstone in the path of advanceraent for a Foreign Service
officer, just as command of a small vessel is a steppingstone for a
naval officer on the path toward becoming an admiral, i-ven in the com-
plexity of the Department of State itructure, the country desk has lost
but little of its old glamor.
The country desk officer, for purposes of this study, is the
officer immediately responsible for the overall work of a country desk.
Sixty per cent of the ninety-six country desks are one-man desks. The
median grade of country desk officers is PSO-4. Fifty-six per cent of
the ninety-six desk officers have served regular tours of duty in their






SOME FACTS ON COUNTRY L>£i£ OFFIC-
ES of February 21, 1963)
60 Percent of the Country L»csks Are One-Man Desks
oatc^ory Number in Category
1 officer - 1 country assigned 46
1 officer - 2 or more countries assigned 11
2 or more officers - 1 country assigned 27
2 or more officers - 2 or more countries assigned 12
TOTAL .... 96
FSO-4 Is the Median Grade of Country ^csk Officers









36 Percent Have Served Regular Tours In Their Assigned Countries
Category Number in Category
Served in assigned country (ies) .... 54
(16 revisited as desk officers)
Have not served in assigned country (ies) 42
(22 have visited as desk officers and
20 have neither served in nor visited)
TOTAL .... 96
Prom Organizing for Action in the Regional bureaus
.
Office of Management, department of State







The desk officer serves as the central point where a broad
spectrum of matters political, economic, consular, cultural, educational,
public affairs, Military, etc., are brought to a focus from the view-
point of the over-all U. S, relationships with a country. He does not
make policy* neither does he decide important matters. He provides
detailed background and does the "pick and shovel" work lor his
superiors.
The desk officer drafts comiauni cat ions for signature by the Office
Director or a higher official, taking into consideration the established
views and policies of the President, secretary of State, and other
officials in the hierarchy of the Department in more responsible positions,
With the exception of official informal letters, he does net have
authority to sign outgoing communications to the posts, other agencies,
the public, or other bureaus in the Department. He prepares briefing
and position papers for the use of other officers of the department ana
the President in their meetings with representatives of the country in
question, or for use at inter-Departmental nee tings or international
conferences.
He maintains close working relationships with the country's embassy
or legation and assists in representation — hospitality extended to
prominent visitors, messages of congratulations, etc. His advice is
sought in connection with specific passport and visa problems, and in
cases of American citizens and interests. If a higher ranking officer
of the Department receives a coll fron the country's ambassador, the
desk officer normally attends the meeting to record fclM proceedings and









The desk officer keeps the U. S. diplomatic Mission overseas
informed of developments in Washington and insures that replies are
made to requests from the posts for information or instructions. He
serves as its primary point of contact in Washington. He reviews and
appraises B'bassy officer reports, brings them to the attention of
interested officers, and insures that they receive appropriate action.
He briefs officers enroute to posts in the country and consults with
those returning to the United States on leave or transfer.
He must be familiar with the viewpoints of the other areas of the
department of State, and of other interested departments ana agencies
of the government. He is expected to know about the leauing personalities
and political parties of the country in question, their influence, and
their attitude toward the United States. He must follow the domestic
and political situation in the country, its press and popular opinion,
its economy and its economic relationships with the United States, and
its international position ana policies.
Relationships
The desk officer's usual relationships involve other bureaus in
the department of State, other departments and agencies that operate
programs in his country, private organizations, the U. S. Ambassador
and diplomatic mission in Washington, White House staff, press, public,
and members of Congress.
^ith Office directors and i)eputv Office directors
The desk officer looks to the Office director and deputy Office
director for guidance, supervision, and leadership. Office directors,









reins tightly. Senior officers in the regional bureaus who have served
previously as desk officers made the observation that desk officers are
consulting with Office directors much more frequently now than several
years ago. The presence of a full-time deputy Office director tends
to cause an extra review of the desk officer's work and a duplication
in recommendation, both up anu down the line.
With deputy Assistant Secretaries
Bach bureau has two or three Deputy Assistant Secretaries, but one
who has full authority to act for the Assistant Secretary in every sense
is not found in all bureaus. They have been relegated to functional or
area specialists or assigned special problems. In absence of a Deputy who
can speak for the bureaus, subordinate officers, on occasion, must consult
more than one Deputy Assistant Secretary or see the Assistant Secretary.
Normally the desk officer* s contacts with the deputy Assistant
Secretary are on an ad hoc basis through the Office Director or bis
Deputy. These contacts are usually prompted by the fact that a Deputy
Assistant Secretary has a special interest in or is working on a matter
concerning the desk officer's country.
With the Assistant Secretary
The desk officer's contacts with the Assistant Secretary depend on
the extent to which the desk officer's country is involved in critical
situations affecting the United States' national interests, how often
distinguished visitors from the desk officer's country call on the
Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary's working habits.
During periods of crisis, the desk officer provides a detailed














the guidance provided by the Assistant Secretary and expanded upon by
the Office director, and generally does what his superiors tell hira
to do.
v«ith the Secretary and Other Senior Officers
Contacts at these levels are infrequent anc occur on an ad hoc
basis. The desk officer's opportunity to meet with the Secretary arises,
if at all, when top government officials representing the desk officer's
country call on the Secretary, fhe desk officer prepares briefing papers,
takes notes, and prepares memoranda of conversations for such a meeting.
Contacts with the Under Secretary, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs arise in
connection with problems of major significance involving U. S. relations
with the desk officer's country or calls by state visitors. Here the
desk officer's role is largely one of keeping the particular official
briefed and carrying out instructions.
When a state visit is planned to the United Mates by another head
of state, the desk officer of the visitor's country is involved in
several stages of a lengthy process. The initiative for such a visit
would probably come from the foreign head of state, who would let it be
known that he would accept an invitation to visit the United States.
This "gentle hint" would be transmitted by the U. S. Ambassador to the
Department, where it would eventually come to the cognizance of the
desk officer, but the Chief of Protocol would be the action officer.
Initially, agree>rent would be sought on a date mutually convenient to
the President and the visiting head of state. Once having passeci this
hurdle, the Chief of Protocol would invite the Country's ambassador in
rtashtn^ton to consult on a proposed itinerary. The country desk officer
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usually joins these consultations ana prepares a memorandum of the
itinerary agreed upon for transmission to the U. 5. Ambassador in the
prospective visitor's country, fhe U. S. Ambassador will clear the
itinerary proposed with the prospective visiting head of state and
transmit concurrence or further suggestions.
*ith the itinerary agreed upon, the Chief of Protocol frantically
arranges details of colors to be flown, who will shake hands with whom,
what national anthems will be played and in what order, and who will stand
where when the visitor* s aircraft arrives. Meanwhile, the desk officer
is busily engaged in preparing the first draft of a "briefing memorandum"
for the President, which covers those subjects likely to be discussed by
the two heads of state anu includes a recommended M, S>. position for
each anticipated subject, this memorandum will work its way through the
chain of command from the bottom to the top with revisions made enroute
until at last it arrives in the rthite House for the President's use.
A similar process is engendered by tl*2 prospective visit of the
President to a foreign country. Here, ."resident K.e r i ic-Cy* s visit to Costa
Kica might be used as an example.
The initiative came from a visiting head of state, who suggested
that a visit by Prrsicent Kennedy to the Central American Republics
would be welcome at his earliest convenience, and an estimated date was
requested. President Kennedy suggested i'\ t he might come in the spring
of the ensuing vear, in reply to the unexpected invitation. »*nen the
interview ended, word of the commitment *m quickly passed to the
department, where a chain reaction was set in motion.
The Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Inter-Anerican Affairs,








Affairs and the desk officers of the six republics involved, consulted
with the ambassadors of the six republics and the White House staff to
arrange dates and fix an itinerary, after weather prognostication and
lengthy dialogues with the U. 6. Ambassadors. It was suggested that
President Kennedy "barnstorm" through all six nations, but this was
rejected in view of time limitations. It was finally ueciued that the
visit to all six nations would be considered made by a visit to San Jose,
Costa Rica, and that all six heads of state and a head of state elect
should meet President Kennedy there.
Jesk officers now carefully prepared "briefing memoranda" for the
President's use, with the breath of the Office director hot on their
necks. The Chief of Protocol meanwhile had the problems of determining
precedence among the heads of state, whose anthem should be played and
in what order, who should shake hands with whom and in what order, how
they should be seated at official gatherings, and who should ride in
what vehicles. Naturally, security was arranged between the Secret
Service and the Costa Rican police and Guardia Nacional. >*hen all of
the ramifications of the visit are considered, it seems almost impossible
that it proceeded so smoothly and successfully.
*ith the Functional Bureaus of the Department of State
The desk officer's relationships were reviewed with a representative
cross-section of his counterparts and their superiors in the functional
bureaus. All tended to characterize working relationships with the
desk officer as generally satisfactory or better, but made the following
observations:
Though generally a good group, desk officers are spotty
in quality and occupy positions of low status.
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The average desk officer is overworked and not on
top of everything.
lis morale is low. He frequently works in crowded
surroundings and at a grade level lower than his counter-
parts.
He is probably too junior for country desks
handling affairs of major importance.
Anything of importance is handled by Office
Directors or officers at a higher level.
Some cannot give an answer without consulting their
Office Directors or Deputy Office Directors.
In suggesting how the situation might be improved, officers in
functional bureaus recommended the assignment of desk officers who act
and make decisions.
With Other Departments and Agencies
Issues of policy are seldom one-department or even one-country
issues in this interdependent world. In this respect the organization
of the government as a whole is the crux of the problem, because there
is seldom any real distinction between domestic policy and foreign
policy. Because almost everything other executive departments do has
a foreign policy aspect, interdepartmental coordination is and will
remain a major operational problem.
Because the Secretary of State is the President's principal
advisor in matters of military and economic aid, cultural and information
programs, reduction and control of arms, as well as diplomacy, he is
also the coordinator of all of these diverse elements of foreign policy.
Like his chief some seven or eight heaus above his, the desk officer
is expected to coordinate the many facets of foreign policy toward one













Interagency task forces as interdepartmental coordinating committees
were a salient feature of the Kennedy Administration as well as of the
successor Johnson Administration. Superficially, they provide an ad hoc
answer to the problem of coordination in critical issues; but they are,
to some extent, an admission that existing policy machinery has proven
inadequate to execute policy. Most of the task forces are dissolved
when their job is done; while others, such as the Latin American Policy
Committee which evolved during the Cuban crisis, remain in existence to
supply a coordinated approach to policy, ashile critical task forces
have been chaired by the President himself or other higher authority, a
few have been chaired by desk officers.
deputy Under Secretary Crockett stated that desk officers are
being encouraged to be leaders of a country team relating to their
country. Weekly or biweekly meetings are held with officers around the
government who have an interest in the desk officer's country programs.
The desk officer in charge of India has a real problem of coordinating
approximately seventy people in the U. S. Government, representing
various agencies, who are interested in India.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffings and Operations, 3dtb Congress, 1st Session,
November 21, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part IV.
There is, of course, a danger in attempting to solve policy
problems in a committee. Committees may delay decision and diffuse
responsibility. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau suggests that committees
produce compromises based on the lowest common denominator or evade
issues through platitudinous statements which satisfy everyone rather















the necessary individual responsibility is lacking. Jean Acheson
•7
Hans J. Morgenthau, "Can *e Entrust defense to a Committee?"
The New fork Times Magazine
.
June 7, 1959.
considers committees as substitutes for thought at the top. Committees




do serve the indispensable function of collecting, appraising, ana
preparing ideas for consideration. Policy here becomes the resultant
merger of a number of ideas from different sources, polished by the
grinding effect of opinion differences. tJut the final uecision is a
personal thing, and no committee procedure provides a substitute for it.
Once the decision is made, the committee serves the useful purpose of
implementing it in the several agencies of its members. The desk
officer, as chairman, must insure that his committee adheres to its
useful functions. Inasmuch as committees will try to avoid responsibility,
the power of decision making will gravitate to a forceful desk officer
who is willing to make decisions and abide their results. It is to be
expected that the desk officer will make an occasional erroneous judge-
ment, but such is the nature of gaining in experience. Higher authority
will correct the mistakes as a matter of course.
The telephone is another indispensable means of coordination for
the desk officer, without it he could not gain rapid and informal
clearances of notes and cables to er-bassies, policy papers, or replies
to Congressmen. Nor could he discuss urgent problems with colleagues
or gather spot information on pressing problems. However, it is both




punctuated by the shrill insistence of the telephone's ring, which may
require him to drop pressing matters for irritating minor ones. For-
tunately, a good secretary shields him from the majority of these
petty annovances.
In order to obtain a different perspective of the desk officer*
s
role and relationships, their contacts with their counterparts and
senior officers in the Department of defense, A. I. d., U. S. 1. A. t and
the Peace Corps were reviewed. According to their appraisals, relations
with desk officers in particular, and the department of Mate in general,
have never been better. They are happy with present relationships. But
the following specific observations are worthy of note :
tfhen a desk officer cannot sign off on an urgent
matter, it causes excessive delay ana can result in
unnecessary embarrassment to the United states.
5ometimes it is not certain whether a desk officer's
position is supported by his superior.
A few desk officers do not seem to unaerstana the
purpose and mission of other foreign affairs agencies.
When the department of State establishes task forces,
the desk officer seems to be left out. This creates
problems for his counterpart in other agencies whose line
of communication with the I>epartraent of State is thus
broken.
Officers in other agencies would like desk officers
to work through established channels in their organization,
.hen they do not, their counterparts lose touch.
Contacts between the uepartment of Jefense and desk officers are,
for the most part, with the defense Intelligence Agency, Office of
International Security Affairs, the plans staff of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Politico-Military Affairs section of the three services.
I. S. A. usually is seeking policy information and guidance from
the desk officer for the supervision of those military agencies wnich
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groups. The political ramifications of the sale of military material
to client countries would probably be discussed in a broad spectrum
extending from the efftct on political alignments to the effect on the
economy. The desk officer also arranges diplomatic clearances, in-
cluding assurance of acceptability, for U. s. personnel assignea to
military missions.
The Defense Intelligence Agency contacts the desk officer to
obtain information or an evaluation of information received. Because
of the constant stream of letters, telegrams, and reports which the
U. S. Diplomatic Mission sends to the Department of Mate, the desk
officer9 usually possesses better and later information than the
i-xcept for "lyes Only" reports held by higher authority.
Defense Intelligence Agency.
The desk officer usually initiates contacts with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to obtain military support for a policy or program decision
already made by higher authority. He may arrange for conferences
between the Office Director or Assistant Secretary and the cognizant
action officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The desk
officer records memorandum minutes of these conferences and supplies
such detailed background information as may be required by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to perform their military functions.
The Politico-Military Affairs sections of the armed forces
obtain policy guidance from the desk officer in an effort to insure
consistency of policy.
Like echelons of the Department of State, by whom it is administered,








The country desk officer receives project proposals from A. I. a. which
cannot be implemented without approval fron the Department of state,
even though A. I. D. field personnel have thoroughly investigated the
project and obtained the U. S. Ambassador's concurrence. The desk officer
examines the proposed project in terms of its political and economic
effects. Who will administer and develop the project in the country are
of interest to the desk officer as indicators of probable cause of
failure. Should the desk officer agree with the project, he initials
concurrence and passes the project proposal to his Office Director. In
these matters, the Office director is generally guided by the opinions of
his desk officer and will approve on his recommendation. If the desk
officer disapproves the project proposal, the final resolution of the
project proposal will occur on the Assistant Secretary or Secretary level.
In an attempt to facilitate coordination of policy planning ana
A. I. J. activities, an administration reorganization was effected in
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Here the Bureau for Latin America,
A, I. J., was completely integrated with the Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs in March, 1V64. Some desk officers now have development-
officer assistants. This reorganization will be discussed more fully
in the pages which follow.
Excepting for important countries, a single person in U. S. 1. A.
is responsible for the activities of that agency in several countries —
a multi-country desk officer. lie discusses two broad categories of
policy with the desk officer; political policy and cultural exchange.
In the field, cultural exchange is administered entirely by the
U. S. I. A. with approval of the U. S. Ambassador. In the United States,
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publishes periodicals, clevises television programs, produces movies,
broadcasts radio programs, and operates bi-national centers. Their
printed, spoken, filmed, and televised words must be in accordance
with established policy. Policy guidance fro™ the Department of State
for a particular country is passed through the medium of the country
desk officer to the multi-desk officer in the U. S. I. A.
The organization of the Peace Corps is basically similar to that
of U. S. I. A. The desk officer receives a policy paper which has been
initiated by a roving field team with approval of the U. S. Ambassador.
The desk officer initials his concurrence or disapproval as in the
case of A. I. u. projects, with the same results.
The organization of the Central Intelligence Agency parallels that
of the Department of State but receives a far larger budget to perform
its functions. In the desk officer's client country, the U. S. Ambassador
may not know or want to know who the operatives of the C. I. A. are and
what they are doing. This viewpoint is shared by only a very few of
our ambassadors. Generally, it is considered that if he is to perform
his functions intelligently, the ambassador must be informed about all
activities of any U. S. governmental group. Me can be informed of C. I. A.
activities if he so desires. In this manner, the C. I. A. becomes an
indirect supplier of client country information to the desk officer.
The C. I. A. frequently also supplies information directly to the desk
officer from their country officer- in- charge in McLean. The C. I. A.,
for example, may have access to "Organization X" in a client country
and receive information as a result of that access. Such information
is passed to the country desk officer by his counterpart in the C. I. A.
The country desk officer is, of course, interested in the information,
- 80 -
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but is not, generally, interested in the methods utilized by the C. I. A.
to obtain the information. In some instances, the desk officer may
already be in possession of the information which the C. I. A. has
obtained.
By the time that the weekly C. I. A. intelligence summary reaches
the desk officer, it is usually stale. Senator Pell stated that while
he held the Rumanian desk, there was an utter lack of intelligence flow
from that source. Secretary Rusk agreed that t sere was indeed a need
to expedite information from the C. I. A. to the desk officer and a
need to suggest priorities for types of information to the C. I. A.
Mr. Rusk said that this matter had received his personal, attention and
that of Mr. McCone.* Interviews indicate that the joint action of
^United States Congress, Senate, Cosssittce on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session,
December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.
Mr. McCone and Secretary Rusk has had a salutary effect, .*here previously
the desk officer had no contact with or knowledge of his C. I. A. counter-
part, both are now encouraged to becone acquainted with each other and
to exchange their ideas and information freely. It is hoped that this
exchange may aid in remedying information gaps when snap decisions are
required.
In 1954 the i>cpartraent of Agriculture obtained Congressional per-
mission to appoint agricultural attaches funded from their own budget.
They had become dissatisfied with their dependency on diplomatic channels
for agricultural information. The concept of agricultural attaches has
since expanded, proliferating into what is now the Foreign Agricultural










attaches are received by the country desk officer, who examines then,
being mindful of their inherent implications — especially in regard to
those countries with "one-crop economies." fthile the political aspects
of the current crop status concern the desk officer, the Department of
Agriculture concerns itself with the effect of that country's crop status
upon the markets of the United States, fhe department of Agriculture may,
as a result, become intent upon a policy which is at cross purposes with
those of the department of State. Noting such a conflict, the desk
officer will try to resolve it on his level* but, if unsuccessful, he
will advise higher authority, appending his recommendations for resolution
to his superiors. Such conflicts may require resolution on the Assistant
Secretary or Secretary level.
Traditionally, the Department of Commerce had its own attaches, but
it lost the right to maintain a separate foreign Commercial Service in
the reorganization of 1939. At present, specially- trained Foreign Service
officers are assigned abroad as commercial attaches. Iheir reports are
received by the desk officer along with other reports from the U. 5.
Diplomatic Mission. The reports, which generally contain traae infor-
mation and opportunities, are forwarded to the Department of Commerce
after the desk officer's perusal. Conflicts of policy arise frequently
here in the indiscriminate encouragement of trade by the Department of
Commerce to countries with inflated economies and dollar shortages, while
the Department of State is interested in encouraging trade only along
such specific lines as will maintain the viability of the client country.
A* with agricultural policy, the desk officer makes every effort to
resolve the differences on his level, forwarding the problem, with his
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with the department of Labor, the desk officer is usually concerned
with labor leader grants. A. I, y., U. ft, 1, a., end cultural i-xchange
also propose labor leauer grants, usually without any coordination
between then, it is the function of the desk officer to cooruinate
these fragmented efforts so that the available resources can best be
utilized and formulated into an integrated program. He assesses the
value, in each case, to the client country and estimates the benefits
which nay redound to the United States. The political implications of
labor leader grants are self-evident, in these instances, as with
agricultural and commercial policy, the desk officer makes recommendations
which, if net accepted, are passed to higher authority for action.
The foregoing governmental agencies are not, of course, the only
agencies which may contact the desk officer for information or pass
information to him. fhe science attaches in scientifically advanced
countries forward reports of scientific advances which may or may not
have political implications. These may require the desk officer to
establish contact with such agencies as the defense Atomic Support
Agency or the National Aeronautical and Space Administration on an ad
hoc basis.
fllth the Congress
Relationships with the Congress are challenging and require
consummate tact. Should the department propose legislation to the
Congress affecting his country, the desk officer* s views are sought
within the Department during legislative drafting sessions. His
participation will also be required in interagency conferences within
the executive department to obtain clearance and agreement on the










and has been assigned to a Congressional committee for hearings, the
desk officer will probably testify at the behest of that committee in
an executive session.
From time to tine the country desk officer may be required to
answer letters from Congressional sources. Such Congressional inquiries
may have been initiated for the information of a congressman or on be-
half of a constituent. These letters are channeled into the sundry
bureaus of the Oepart^ient by the Bureau of Congressional Relations and
are scheduled for reply within a three-day period. If an official
response cannot be cleared within this time limit, the desk officer is
required to notify the Congressional originator by phone or letter why
the answer is not immediately forthcoming and set a date for an answer.
i4»ith the Ambassador and the IJ . S. Diplomatic Mission
The desk officer is the primary link between the ambassador and
Washington. The ambassador looks to the desk officer to keep him in-
formed, to see that his views are properly presented and considered in
policy and decision making, to coordinate action in Washington affecting
the ambassador's responsibilities, to prod others into completing action
requested by the U. S. Mission, and to see that the ambassador has what
he needs to carry out his responsibilities as Chief of the U. S. Mission.
While he interprets and presents the ambassador's point of view,
the desk officer does not feel that his role is limited to being an
advocate for the ambassador's views. As a part of his responsibility
to the Assistant Secretary, he sees his role as putting things in their
proper perspective. If the desk officer does not agree with the
ambassador, he is expected to sav so and be prepared to support his case.
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In this middleman role, the desk officer can contribute to a narrowing
of the area of disagreement where it exists.
With the Country's diplomatic Mission in Washington
The desk officer is the primary point of contact for the country's
diplomatic mission in Washington in its dealings with the department.
The mission's day-to-day business with the Department is with or through
the desk officer, who sees that its requests are answered. Por some
desk officers, this can be time consuming, while for others it may be
negligible, depending upon the activity generated by the mission. There
is no set pattern with respect to whom ambassadors see in the Department.
This is governed by the personality and temperament of the ambassador
and the business at hand. Some call on Assistant Secretaries* others
call on Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Office Directors; a few call on
desk officers. Some restrict their calls to high ranking officers above
the Assistant Secretary level.
When the ambassador calls on officials on the Assistant Secretary
level or higher echelons in the Department hierarchy, the desk officer
is usually present, making his expertise available to that official.
If the Department knows sufficiently in advance of the call, the desk
officer draws up a "briefing memorandum" for the official to be called.
This memorandum includes background information and a U. S. position if
the subject to be discussed is known in advance. Where the subject is not
known in advance, the memorandum becomes, of necessity, lengthier, covering
many possible topics together with U. S. positions on each topic.
Following the meeting, the desk officer prepares a "memorandum of
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for future reference. Should the ambassador leave a "note** or an
"aide raemoire," the desk officer prepares the first draft of any reply
thereby necessitated. Information copies of these go, in final form,
to interested agencies in Washington and cognizant overseas posts.
Assume, for example, that agreement has been reached between the
ambassador and the Department in conversation for the transfer of some
surplus U. 6. property. In this event, a third-person note will be
drafted by the desk officer to the foreign embassy expressing the
pleasure of the jjepartment in the agreement. He also drafts an out-
going cable advising the U. S. Ecsbassy abroad of the agreement, supple-
menting this with a personal letter to the embassy staff if he possesses
any detailed information of value, and/or formal instructions to the
embassy delineating the process of transfer — documents involved, copies
required, signatures, and forwarding of receipts.
Policy and decision Making
d Lac)c or" Written Guidelines
The desk officer performs the staff work involved in marshaling
facts, drafting papers, and recommending courses of action. His drafts,
sometimes modified by his superiors but often untouched, usually reach
the Assistant Secretary or may even go to the National Security Council
for consideration and to the President for final decision. His in-
fluence depends on his detailed knowledge of the area and the confidence
which his superiors have in his knowledge, judgement, and ability.
Unless his views are not in consonance with his superiors* views,
it is easier for them to concur, making minor revisions. "The tyranny
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UElder, p£. cit,, p. 23.
guidelines for hits to folio**. The desk officer learns through experience,
though there are some unwritten rules followed consistently throughout
the five regional bureaus.
The Unwritten Rules
Briefly, the unwritten rules are
:
The desk officer must consult his Office director on
any shift in policy or any matter of real significance or
sensitivity.
Decisions on deviations from established policy are
made by the Assistant Secretary, his deputy, or at a higher
level in the Department.
Any official communication leaving the Department
must have at least the Office Director's approval.
Desk officers can clear papers initiated by other
elements of the Department and other agencies if the
subject matter reflects established policy.
In the case of the sustained serious crisis, the tendency is to
take raatters of consequence out of the desk officer* s hands. Task
forces or other special arrangements are instituted to cover critical
aspects. Under these special arrangements, the desk officer carries
on the routine, daily operations work of the country desk.
The Scope of the Desk Gfficer's Authority
The desk officer's role in policy making and application is a
combination of recommending policy and carrying it out once the policy
is decided at higher levels. The broad goals of policy as formulated
by the National Security Council and approved by the President quickly
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and continuing nature, having been formulated prior to his becoming a
desk officer. They set general limits within which he carries out
policy and considers alternatives. He implements it in his daily
activities by drafting instructions to the U. S. diplomatic Mission
and other action documents, by providing guidance to other elements in
the Department and to other agencies in the government, and by clearing
papers having policy implications. Though he participates in the
development of policy recommendations, the process of policy making is
dispersed and diffused all the way from the desk officer to the Secretary
of State, the National Security Council, and, in some instances, to the
President.
i>esk officers have a free rein to recommend or initiate action
whenever they think action is called for. They make many routine
decisions within the established policy every day. If there is no
precedent, or if a shift in policy is involved, the desk officer will not
act without the approval of the Office Director. In these cases, he is
expected to make a recommendation. Normally, he has the opportunity of
expressing his views on all matters pertaining to his country. The
exception occurs when task forces or other special arrangements are
instituted to cover the critical aspects.
Planning and Programming
Policy Guidelines Statements
The desk officer's primary involvement in planning concerns drafting
and follow-through on policy guidelines statements covering his country.
In doing this he consults with his Office Director, functional specialists













having a reason to participate, and his counterparts in other departments
and agencies, particularly defense, A. I, t>., and U. 6. I. A. Before
formal clearance of his draft with other agencies, he obtains the U. a.
diplomatic Mission* s comments ana incorporates them, as appropriate.
At this point, the responsibility of the desk officer and the bureau
Planning Officer blur. Some desk officers take the initiative in
interagency clearances. In other cases, the Office director, ueputy
Office director, or the 3ureau Planning Officer assumes this responsibility.
Although efforts are made to reach agreement before papers are sent to
the assistant Secretary for approval, major differences are referred,
when necessary, to higher authority through established channels.
Special Policy Studies
In addition to his work on policy guidelines statements, the desk
officer responds to requests for special policy studies initiated by
the Policy Planning Council, Bureau Planning officers, National Security
Council, or elsewhere, such as requests for contingency plans. Je writes
the first drafts and acts in the role described above in connection with
the policy guidelines statements. He checks oraf ts for factual accuracy,
suggests changes, and generally brings bis country knowledge and
experience to bear on the situation.
Programming
The current role of the desk officer in action programming is
restricted largely to reviewing program plans for clearance by other
agencies. He insures that the appropriate elements of the Department
review the programs, if other elements are involved, ana sees that they
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The Plan of Action
For other than occasionally refreshing his memory, the desk officer
seldom needs to refer to the policy guidelines statement, because he
drafted it, and because it is cast in the general terms of goals, fhe
plan of action which outlines policy for a six-month period is also
drafted by the desk officer. In drafting a new plan of action, he will
first peruse that which served for the previous six-month period. Then,
after reflecting on information available to him, the country desk officer
drafts a paper which varies in length according to the information con-
sidered pertinent in determining courses of action. The paper consists
of three major parts, an estimate of the current situation, courses of
action and an evaluation of each course, and methods of implementation.
On completion, the plan is examined by the Office Director and then
circulated on the Assistant Secretary level to the Department of i>efense,
Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, the
Ahite House, and U. S. Information Service five days in advance of
their conference to consider acceptance or rejection. If accepted, its
suggestions become the policies which are pursued for the ensuing semi-
annual period. If rejected, the Assistant Secretary will probably draft
a plan of action based on decisions reached at the conference.
The Briefing Book
fcach desk officer maintains an up-to-date briefing book on his
client country. It includes general background data, the political and
economic situation, U. S. agency projects in the country, and a dis-
cussion of its relations with the United States. The President, Vice
President, members of Congress, or other government leaders find it
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vacation trips abroad. It is likewise available for ready reference
within the Jepartssent for other levels of the hierarchy, These books
are reproduced and distributed throughout the regional bureaus to help
in achieving coordination of information and policy.
12 *See Elder, oj>. cit
. .
p. 38, for some comments on the usefulness
of briefing books. However, desk officers whom I have interviewed
have not disparaged their utility.
Intelligence and Lvaluation
Usually the desk officer has more than enough information avail-
able for policy-making decisions. The American Embassy sends daily
telegrams on questions which require immediate action. Additional
supporting details are sent via courier or air-mail pouch. A broad
summary of political, military, and economic developments is forwarded
by the embassy weekly, with similar, but more comprehensive, reports
sent quarterly, semi-annually, and annually.
Of course, daily political, economic, and military intelligence
reports are available for his day-to-day operations, in addition, there
is a weekly intelligence summary prepared by the 0. I. A., which say be
stale by the time it reaches the desk, but the exhaustive evaluation it
contains wakes it useful.
The embassy also forwards press clippings of editorials and news-
worthy events to supplement the teletype Associated i'ress. United Press
International, and Reuters reports received in the Office of News. This
office also clips information from twenty-eight U. S. newspapers and
distributes them to the desks.
Because policy affects a multiplicity of government agencies and









which tend to inhibit coordination arise from an inscnsitivity in under-
standing pronounced Presidential policy. Though the t resident *s decisions
trickle downward from the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and
other Presidential working groups, his public statements, which are
directed to government employees as well as the public at large, are too
often lost in the mad scramble of daily business or glossed over. The
failure to appreciate the nuances and intent of these public statements
impedes the progress of interdepartmental business.
The Honorable <*. Avereil Harriman, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, insists that careful reading of the President's
speeches, statements, and press conferences is a requirement for officers
at every level of government, especially for country desk officers in the
department of State. He further indicates that a man cannot last in the
administration without doing so, because he will not be able to function
13
adequately in foreign policy formulation.
13United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 33th Congress, 1st Session,
March 11, 22, and 25, 1963 (Washington. Government Printing Office, 1963),
part I.
For this same reason, the department's Public Opinion Studies Staff
circulates summaries of American press editorial comment each day.
Broader summaries are prepared on a monthly basis, while public attitude
toward specific policy issues is the subject of separate, detailed study.
In most bureaus, marked copies of the New York Times are routed,
indicating comments or articles relating to the desk officer's country.
Additionally, in his leisure time at home, Foreign Affairs and the
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings describe world developments elsewhere.
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Specialized research within the department is performed by the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Historical Office, or the Bureau
of Kconomic Affairs for the desk officer as well as higher echelons.
Other information may be gleaned from studies prepared by the Legislative
Reference Service for the Congress or possibly from data gathered by an
outside consultant.
In addition to information received from the U. S. diplomatic Mission,
the C. I. A. f and the J, I. A #f the desk officer gleans information from
individuals — lobbyists, speculators, disgruntled exiles, personnel of
the client country's embassy, reporters, and tourists, bone of these
may also be searching for information which may aid them in their
pursuits.
With experience, the desk officer will develop a "sixth sense"
concerning the reliability of the information received. He considers the
source, whether or not the information reflects the known views of the
source, and whether or not the source could reasonably be expected to
have such information available. Having determined the amount of con-
fidence to be placed in the intelligence received, the desk officer
proceeds to choose a suitable course of action.
Choice
The desk officer's choice is conditioned by his knowledge of the
individuals involved, the plan of action, and current intelligence. The
views of the U. S. diplomatic Mission in the client country also receive
due consideration prior to making any decision, fhe desk officer weighs
these factors judiciously in his mind before drafting recommendations
for consideration by the policy committee. Contrary to what some outside
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Action , Reaction , and Ree va luation
policy committee also gives careful consideration to embassy
views prior to making their decision. Once made, the decision is
communicated to the U, b. diplomatic Mission by electronic means,
supplemented with letters. Purther copies are distributed to other
agencies which are or may become involved.
If the decision should be contrary to the expressed views of the
U. S. Ambassador, the assistant Secretary will direct the Office director
or desk officer to prepare an amplifying letter for his signature, which
explains the reasoning involved in the decision. The ambassador, if he
feels strongly about the course of action, may bombard the desk officer
with a stream of missives in the hope that the decision may be reversed.
If this action does not produce a satisfactory response, the ambassador
may visit Washington for "consultation."
A policy which produces adverse effects is reexamined. The desk
officer has ready alternatives which he proposes to t*e Office Director.
The same policy committee will be reconvened to examine the alternatives
and choose one which offers the most promise of success. Policy changes
can be effected rapidly, but programs may continue in the old direction
from sheer inertia or because no satisfactory terminus can be immediately
reached. A. I. U. operations are most susceptible to this form of inertia.
Leadership and Coordination
In its December, 1962, report, tHe Committee on Foreign Affairs
Personnel stated.
The L>epartreent*s role should embrace not only the
formulation of foreign policies, but also leadership in
seeing that they are effectuated, the capacity of the
- 94 -
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department to provide this leadership and coordination in
the conduct of foreign affairs needs to be strengthened
. . .
Responsibility of the Ltesk Officer
The desk officer's responsibility for exercising leadership and
coordination has never been defined or fixed. It is unrealistic to expect
bin to assume such a responsibility under present staffing arrangements.
An officer is assigned a country desk to gain experience which will pre-
pare him for positions of leadership later in his career. As stated
previously, he is a younger Foreign Service officer who shows promise of
becoming a senior officer in the future. This points up the conflict
between those who see the desk officer as a trainee destined for a
position of leadership and those who expect him to exercise leadership
and coordination now.
On the whole, desk officers try conscientiously to discharge a
responsibility for which they have insufficient qualifying experience.
Some have taken the initiative to meet regularly with their counterparts
in other agencies to exchange information, identify problems, and develop
courses of action. These meetings are usually informal.
More frequently, ambassadors are being heard in expressions of
dissatisfaction with the lack of coordination in Washington anong depart-
ments, agencies, and other organizations carrying out operations in
countries to which they are assigned. Sorae have proposed that a counter-
part of the "country team** be established in the Apartment. It is
certainly clear that a higher ranking officer must provide the kind of
interagency leadership and coordination required.
Resolving Conflicting Policies
Resolutions of conflicting policies result, too often, in a com-
promise policy which does not completely satisfy the department of State
- 95 -
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or the other agency involved in the dispute. Policy disputes are most
often resolved on the Assistant Secretary level in an ad hoc conference.
However, the desk officer will exhaust the means for resolution on his
level prior to action by higher authority. If unsuccessful in this
venture, the desk officer prepares a paper delineating the position of
the Department of State for his Assistant Secretary. Some examples of
policies which lead to conflict are
:
Department of defense desiring to
sell obsolete U. S. arms to governments which do not enjoy the confidence
of the Department of State; the "buy American** program of Commerce which
may run afoul of a State Department program of keeping a client country's
economy viable.
How a Country Desk Officer Spends His Time
A conscientious country desk officer is not an "eight to four"
bureaucrat. The things which he must do cannot begin to be accomplished
in eight hours. He therefore has to come early and stay late.
No desk officer can ever count on a routine day. The following
schedule may not therefore be entirely typical, but it is revealing.
0815 - 0915 Reads incoming corresponaence and telegrams
from the field. Takes action as necessary.
Reads newspaper.
0915 - 1000 ^aily staff conference with other desk officers,
chaired by his Office director. (The Office
Director has just come from the assistant
Secretary's staff conference.)
1000 - 1145 Conference with representatives from State,
Agriculture, and the International Cooperation
Administration to agree on the text of a grant
to his country under Public Law 480 dealing
with the disposal of surplus agricultural
commodities.
1145 - 1245 Drafts telegram to American Lrabassy overseas,
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on grant. Carries telegram by hand around
Department for clearance.
Drafts tentative copy of formal Department
Instructions which will go to American
-Embassy overseas to accompany text of
proposed grant.
Lunch
Writes a personal, informal letter to the
Charge d'Aff aires in the American Embassy
overseas to explain the proposed grant.
Attends special conference to brief the
Under Secretary of Commerce who is going to
a trade fair in his country as the President's
representative. The desk officer details
political and economic conditions in the
country and explains cultural differences.
Briefs a teacher who is going to his country
on an exchange program. Discusses housing
problems, the country's educational system,
research facilities, as well as political,
economic, and social conditions.
Reads memoranda and telegrams which have
come to his desk during the day for clearance.
Writes comments or recommendations.
Reads reports from field and other sources of
information which have come to his desk
during the day.
Reads incoming correspondence and telegrams
from the field. Takes action as necessary.
14Prom Elder, op_. cit
., pp. 30-31,
In addition to those events recorded above, the day has been inter-
spersed with phone calls, both incoming and outgoing — a Congressman,
a businessman with interests in the client country, one to his client
country's embassy in Washington and one from it, one to OP-61 in the
Pentagon, and one from I. S. A. in the Pentagon. He also sought the






with desk officers in neighboring offices. There were no personal
visitors from his client country's embassy during this day.
The chart on the following page is a graphic display of how a desk
officer spends his time. It is based on estimates provided by desk
officers interviewed in the course of a study conducted by the Office
of Management.
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HOW A COUNTRY DESK OFFICER SPENDS HIS TIME
(Estimates stated in median percentages)
\
Incoming field reports and communications 15%; Department and other
Government agency materials 5%, press and publications 5%.
Drafting and clearing outgoing communications.
Participating in drafting and discussions of planning and other
policy papers.
Congressional 5%; public 5%, press 3%.
Preparing briefing papers for use in Department and' White House.
Briefing individuals and groups interested in country assigned.
Providing information and assisting on variety of subjects. Arranging
appointments for Ambassador and visiting dignitaries.
Average: 3 regular and 3 Ad Hoc meetings each week,
==
Misc. 2% ( Administrative and other activities.b in iiiMi'ii jni aasaaaH
From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus
,
Office of Management, Department of State





This chapter will outline the mechanical steps in policy making
in order to relate the desk officer* s role in a fictitious, but probable,
situation.
Background for a Fictitious Policy
Note
The following country and the events involved in making U. S. policy
toward that country are fictitious. The relationship of the policy
delineated herein to actual U. 8, policy is purely coincidental, because
it is a composite of U. S. policies pursued at various times toward many
diverse countries. The country described herein exists only in the
imagination of the author, and its resemblance to any actual state is
also coincidental. All sample telegrams in this chapter are representative
of those which might actually be sent under similar circumstances.
Country Background
Algerobia, or the Algerobies, is a chain of volcanic ana coral
islands located in the Southwest Pacific Ocean, midway between Hawaii and
New Zealand. The population (2,525,990 in 1950) is centered primarily
on the three largest islands of Baccala, Molto, and Tiki. These three
islands of the Algerobian Archipelago are the only ones of 302 islands
with an area of more than 2 square miles. Baccala, the most northerly,
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square miles. Baccala is the most populous (1,063,078), while Molto
(915,853) and Tiki (442,034) are less densely populated. There are
100,025 persons living in the lesser islands, mostly of mixed aboriginal
and negro stock. The average population density is 377.2 per square mile.
The primary industry of Algerobia is the cultivation of cacao.
Though in recent years sugar and sisal have increased in importance,
cacao still accounts for 81 per cent of the national income. These
industries provide subsistence on the three major islands. In the outer
islands, the population subsists mainly on fishing and intermittant
copra gathering.
Ethnic groups include; Negroes (1,078,078), Mestizos (901,853),
Polynesians (285,043), and Chinese (261,016). The negroes were imported
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from Africa by the Spanish
conquerors of the Algerobies. The Polynesians are all that remain of
the once numerous aboriginal population which inhabited the archipelago
on the eve of its conquest. The Chinese population migrated there in
the late nineteenth century to work on the cacao plantations when
slavery was outlawed.
Santo Tomas de Baccala is the largest city (658,172) and the
principal port of the Algerobies. This city is also the seat of
government. It possesses an excellent roadstead in its harbor, able to
accommodate the largest of commercial vessels. Major sugar refineries,
distilleries, and sisal processing plants are located here.
Nueva Aguila on the Island of Molto is the second city (275,383),
where most of the cacao processing plants are located. Nueva Valencia,
the third city (193,284), is located on Tiki, where there are other
cacao processing plants and a few factories for processing sisal. Like
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Santo Toraas de Baccala, both of these cities possess excellent harbors,
but neither has developed its port facilities as extensively.
Volcanoes, new and old, are the most conspicuous feature of the
landscape. Seismic disturbances are aiso common.
Typhoons of a destructive force are an annual occurrence, striking
the islands in the south and usually curving toward the northwest.
Concomitant or subsequent torrential rains, and not the high velocity
winds, cause most of the damage to property.
Temperature variations are minor. Rainfall is plentiful in the
summer and autumn but intermittent in the winter and spring.
The Algerobies were discovered by t*on Haltasar de Algeroby, in 1564,
while on a voyage of exploration from Nueva ispana at the behest of the
Spanish Crown. He returned in the following yeur with a fleet of seven
ships and 1,020 colonists and established the city of Santo foraas de
Baccala on the shores of the Bahia de Baccala. The ensuing conquest of
the area was easily accomplished because of the hospitable nature of the
Polynesian aboriginals. Thence the Spanish conquerors settled down to
operate large plantations and enslave the aboriginals, who were nearly
exterminated in the process. As the aboriginals died off or fled to hide
in the tropical forests, negro slaves were imported in large quantities
to labor in the growing plantation economy.
In 1610, the islands suffered a i>utch invasion which, though defeated,
destroyed nearly all of the economy built up by that time. The next
invaders were British, who appeared off the coasts in 1762 with a well-
equipped fleet and easily subdued the ill-prepared garrison. The British
did not remain to enjoy the fruits of their conquest but restored it to
Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1763.
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In 1813, having noted the commencement of uprisings in other parts
of the Spanish Empire, Julio Xortuga led an abortive three-year effort
to gain independence. It was cruelly crushed by General Alfredo Perez,
leading an army of regulars and mestizos at the Battle of Umballawalla
in 1816. No further significant uprisings for independence occurred
until 1849. In that year Gustavo Mata opened a revolt of mestizos and
negroes which was successful after a guerilla-type struggle of five
years duration.
General Mata's provisional government convened a constitutional
convention at Santo Tomas de Baccala in 1856. Here a liberal constitution
was framed establishing a bicameral legislature of limited powers under
a powerful executive who was to be elected for a single seven-year term.
General Mata was elected as the first president in i^ecember, 1856, by a
franchise extended to all property-owning males above the age of twenty
years. He was assassinated in 1865 after having abrogated the consti-
tutional provisions pertaining to the presidency to permit himself to be
elected to that office for life. His successor and assassin, Colonel
Narciso Paredes, also died in office, being poisoned in the wake of
oppressive anti-Chinese measures in 1871.
Since then, only three of the twenty-four presidents have succeeded
peacefully to that office and peacefully departed from it. Until 1933
the usual assassination or palace revolution "elected" ana "inaugurated"
a new president. From 1933 to 1954, the Algcrobics enjoyed a growing
prosperity derived from good cacao crops and a rising cacao price in
the world markets. Their prosperity continued despite growing world
tensions ana was uninterrupted in the coming conflict. The Algerobies
were undisturbed by early Japanese hegemony in the pacific and remained
- 102 -
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completely neutral until they granted the Allied Powers permission to
construct airfields and supply bases on Oaccala. The economy remained
prosperous following thr end of hostilities as the world demand for
cacao increased, despite growing competition in the world market from
African nations.
In the winter of 1954, following the election of at, i^ldemiro Gonivo
as president, an especially destructive typhoon lashed the islands,
leaving a devastation from which it recovered but slowly. .*ith Algerobian
cacao production at a fraction of its former level, other producing
countries seized the opportunity to expand their markets and captured
former Algerobian customers. Vith patient rebuilding, the Algerobian
producers regained a few of their customers; but they were unable to
regain sone 16 per cent of their former markets, and the economy suffered
accordingly.
With U. S. funds and technical assistance, a vast program of cash
crop diversification was initiated. Unfortunately, this program ground
slowly to a halt in the face of opposition from the mestizo landowners
who form the majority of the support for Jr. Gonivo* s government, aith
their support assured, dr. Gonivo abrogated the constitution and was
elected president for life in 1961. The promising social revolution
"died aborning" and cash crop diversification withered away.
Beginning in 1961, dr. Gonivo organized his followers into several
para-military organizations and armed then with modern dzech weapons.
These organizations have been used to stamp out opposition to his rule —
potential or actual. Their cruel methods, reminiscent of Hitler's
Gestapo, have shocked the civilized world, provoking widespread liberal
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their leaders and executing then on trumped-up charges of treason.
These he replaced with officers personally loyal to himself.
The small, vociferous communist party was formally outlawed by a
rubber stamp legislature in late 1961. .Their few members were hunted
down by inflamed mobs and burned alive, fheir skulls decorate the
entrance gates of the Ministry of Justice.
Guerilla warfare reduced the national income by 8 per cent before
it was completely crushed. Sugar cane fields, cacao plantations, and
sisal plants were burned or sabotaged. However, the results of the
guerilla efforts were not sufficiently demonstrable to maintain support.
Apathy grew apace, auu real opposition endeu through Jr. Gonivo's paid
informer program. A heavily rewarded informer enabled the Guardia
Nacional to ambush and machine gun the last opposition on Algerobian
territory.
Opposition to the I). S. aid program led to mob violence against
the property of the U. S. Embassy. Or. Gonivo's henchmen subjected
American diplomatic personnel and their property to such indignities
that a rupture of relations with the United States has been all but
imminent. The U. S. Ambassador returned to Washington for consultations.
Many Embassy personnel were expelled, and the U. 5. Government retaliated
in kind against Algerobian Embassy personnel in Washington. Remaining
at the U. S. Embassy were, the Charge d'Affaires Aa Interim, the Pirst
Secretary/Political Officer, the Second Secretary/Economic Officer, the
Second Secretary/Adainistrative Officer, the Assistant Attache (C. I. A.),
the Army Attache, and the Naval Attach^.
On the morning of Pebruary 3, 1963, Mt« Pompier, a long-dormant
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of volcanic debris were hurled miles into the atmosphere, and molten
lava rushed down its slopes, sweeping everything before it.
Simultaneously, strong tremors shook the island, causing buildings
to topple, streets to crack into yawning chasms, and boulders to roll
from the mountains. Tn the wake of this seismic disturbance, a tsunami
struck the coast, wreaking further havoc.
Policy Development
Reporting
From the first explosive rumble of Mt. Pompier, the Charge was out
of bed to observe. i-Hjring the tremors that followed, he and bis family
went to the yard of his residence to escape any debris which might be
shaken loose from his house. This newly ano substantially built edifice
remained undamaged, though it swayed noticeably in the seismic disturbance
which was interrupting the normal lassitude.
With the cessation of tremors, the Charge dressed and drove rapidly
to the cable office to send out his first report, while his wife
commenced telephoning other Embassy personnel to ascertain their well-
being. As he drove through the streets he noted that the municipal
police and the Guardia Nacional were already assembling to maintain order,
while the Cuerpo de Bowheros raced with their apparatus to answer alarms.
Ambulance sirens also howled for clearance enroute on missions of mercy.
At the cable office, he drafted a brief and concise report which
informed the Depart toent of what he knew at that tine, borne information
addresses were included in the chance that their host countries were
disturbed by the same events. Other information addresses were included
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later be called upon to assist in seme runner. The message, as received
in Washington, appears following. 1
Excluding certain message headings which are of interest only to
communications technicians, the messages which follow will be sub-
stantially as received in the Department of State's Operations Center,
incoming or outgoing.
UNCLUSIPUi)






ALGEROBI' S DEI NT, SHAKEN BY VIOLENT EARTHQUAKE 4-30 AM FEBRUARY 3. EMBASSY
PERSONNEL BELH-V1 > SAFE. NO INFORMATION LOCAL AMERICANS. DETAILS TO
FOLLOW.
SMITH
Initial reactions in the Department ; Gemination of Policy
Though the above message was sent out at 4
:
58 A.M. local zone time,
it was not received in the Department until 11
:
30 A.M. because of zone
time differences and tine consumed in transmissions and receipts. The
si*-hour time difference between the post and the Department must be
borne in mind when reading the messages in this chapter. For this same
reason, it was not received in Wellington, Canberra, or Noumea until the
following day, these cities being across the International Date Line.
By 11.35 A.M. this message was in the Operations Center, and copies
were being distributed to the White House, the Secretary, the Under Secretary,
the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Far
Eastern Affairs, the Office Director for Southwest Pacific Affairs, and
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the desk officer — the Officer in Charge of Algerobian Affairs. Further
distribution was made throughout A. I. D. hierarchy in a similar manner.
The immediate reaction of the desk officer was a thought that the
United States should wait and see the extent of damage and be prepared
to render aid for humanitarian reasons if necessary. A large factor in
determining whether or not aid should be given would depend on whether or
not aid was requested and what recommendations were made by the Charge'
d'Affaires Ad Interim. The desk officer outlined his thoughts briefly
in conversation with his Office director, aoding that if aid should be
given, it should be administered directly to the Algerobian people and
divorced from the Gonivo Administration as much as circumstances permitted.
The Office Director concurred in these thoughts and indicated that
preliminary guidance in this vein had just been received by telephone
from the Assistant Secretary. Because the Department of Defense had been
2
an information addressee on the message, there was no need to telephone
"Hlsually written and spoken as addee in U. S. military communications.
authorities there.
In the Department of Defense, the message had been received in the
Communications Center and had received distribution in that agency. Like-
wise, distribution had been made in C. I. A,, U. S. I. A., and other
interested government agencies.
Policy had been germinated, but nothing more could be done or
planned pending information from the post.
Amplifying the Report
After transmitting his initial message to the Department, the Charge
d«Affaires Ad Interim had gone directly to the U. S. Embassy, which he
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found intact and undamaged. His staff officers had already begun the
laborious process of investigating the safety of American citizens known
to them. A radio was tuned to the local broadcast frequency to glean
information, but thus far only a repeated appeal from the district Military
Commander urging calmness and promising assistance had been heard.
By 9
:
30 A.M., through news broadcasts, local employee observation,
and informal telephone conversations with other diplomatic missions in the
capital, the Jefe del Cuerpo de Boraberos, the Jefe de la Policia, and
the Jefe del Kstado Mayor General de la Guardia Nacional, a partial
picture of the damage could be pieced together. Though building damage
was widespread throughout the city of Santo Tomas, its northeast section
had been hit hardest. A majority of the known American citizens residing
in the area had been contacted and found safe and uninjured. However,
the welfare of all known American citizens could not be determined
because of intermittent telephone operation. The death count was rising
and not yet complete, but was apparently extensive. The few hospitals
were treating the injured on a mass-pro. uct ion basis. The utility
companies were hard at work trying to restore services. Based on this
information, an amplifying telegram was encrypted and sent to the
department of State. It was encrypted to prevent the Gonivo Administration
from gaining any knowledge of proposed U. 5. aid in view of the strained
relations existing between the two governments. The message, as de-
crypted in the department Operations Center, follows below,
CONFIDENTIAL
February 3, 1963
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ENFOi AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 27
AMEMBASSY CA DiRRA PRIORITY 17
AMCONSUL NOUMEA PRIORITY 4
POLAD CINCPAC PRIORITY 29
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIORITY UNN
EMBTEL 197
1. BACCALA STRUCK BY VIOLENT BARTHQl JE 7 AT 4.37 AM
WITH ASSOCIATED VOLCANIC ACTIVITY.
2. PRELIMINARY AND FRAGMENTARY REPORTS INDICATE SCORES D&U> HOTMBt
INJURED.
3. BUILDING DAMAGE 5AVTO TOMAS WIDESPREAD. AATER MAINS RVi OH-
EAST SECTION CITY. COMMUNICATIONS INTERMITTENT. I-LBCTRIC POtfER OUT
NORTHEAST SECTION CXTY.
4. EMBASSY UNDAMAGIO. NO iUCAN CITIZENS BUI EMBASSY
MAKING EPFORTS ASCERTAIN THI1U WELFARE ANy ^HEREABOUTS THIS CONSULAR
DISTRICT.
5. DC NOT I KAISI QUESTION PCSSIBLH U. S. AID BUf RECOMMJ
CONSIDERATION AND PLANNING IN EVENT SUCH REqUJ STliU BY GOA.
6. IF GOA REVESTS ASSISTANCE RECOMMEND IT BE LIMITED TO POODSTUPFS AND
MEDICI tlECTLY ADMINISTERED IN ORDER AVOID IT BEING CONSTRUE AS
SUPPORT FOR GONIVO REGIME.
SMITH
CONFIDENTIAL
This telegram was received in Washington at 4*20 P.M., ana by
4 j 35 P.M. had been decrypted and distributed in the same manner as its
predecessor. Paragraphs 5 and 6 contain the Charge's assessment of
what might be done and how. His views are, it will be noted, in con-
sonance with the opinions prevailing in the Department and are indicative
of a close and harmonious working relationship between the Department and
the post.
Origination of a Private Request
Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the first message, news
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the United States. These reports caused the Baptist Missionary Society
considerable concern for one of their number in the Algerobies. A phone
call to the department of state did little to ease their worry, because
the Department's only information was based on the first telegram. Though
the Algerobian desk officer assured them that they would be advised in
the event that their missionary "sister" were injured or dead, this
assurance was insufficient to calm their fears. The society's secretary
therefore phoned a friendly senator, who advised that he would personally
make every effort on behalf of his constituent's welfare.
Shortly thereafter, the senator phoned the Aigerobian desK officer
and requested that a specific query be dire c tea to the U. f« Embassy to
determine the status of his constituent missionary, because the desk
officer had gleaned most of the details from his pnone conversation with
the missionary society, it was only a matter of minutes before he had a






AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS IMMEDIATE 93
EMBTBL 197
SENATOR HOOPLI CONCERNED SAFETY QOMIlfUBIIX PANfii QM, Bat U$E
MISSIONARY, QUINTA LOS BORRACHOS, AVENJOA PRINCIPAL, URBANIZACION LOS
TEQUES, NLT.VA AGUILA. ADVISE SOONEST.
RUSK.
With the receipt of the second message from the post, the desk
officer could somewhat allay the fears of the senator and the Baptist
Missionary Society, but final disposition o£ the request would have to
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from the Department are always signed with the name of the Secretary
of State.
Preliminary Planning
On receipt of the second message from the Charge, the Office director
instructed the desk officer to contact the Department of Defense to learn
what support that agency could supply in case the Algerobian Government
did request aid. The desk officer phoned I. S. A. in the Department of
defense and talked with a colonel, U. S. A. t who had jurisdiction in
Algerobian matters for that agency.
The colonel advised the desk officer that he, too, had received
both messages from the Charge and had done some preliminary planning.
In his view, present armed forces operating schedules would permit the
dispatch of two large cargo aircraft if only small quantities of aid
were desired. If a larger quantity of supplies were requested, a U. S.
Navy A£A was completing a shipyard availability at Bremerton and could
be made available for operations commencing February 6. However, both
the desk officer and the colonel concluded that any further planning
would be contingent upon more specific information from the febr.ssy.
The gist of this conversation was reported to the Office director,
who agreed in the conclusion. He then directed the desk officer to
draft a telegram to Baccala, advising th*» Charge of the Departments
concurrence in the recommendations set forth in the Embassy's telegram
-U98. The Office Director indicated, additionally, that the Assistant
Secretary would "sign off"'* on this message. An unencrypted copy of
3
Normally, messages such as this, which fix policy, are initialed
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this message, which was cleared with A. I. D. and the Apartment of












CONCUR YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS PARAS 5 AND 6. FURTHER PLANNING HERE
CONTINGENT UPON YOUR PROPOSALS.
RUSK
CONFIDENTIAL
The desk officer spent the remainder of the afternoon and the early
evening in answering the phone calls made by anxious relatives of
American citizens in the Algerobies. He also phoned the ^lgerobian
Embassy to determine the extent of their knowledge of the earthquake
but found that his information was better than theirs, When he departed
for home, he advised the Department's Operations Center where he could
be reached should an important message be received.
atchful Waiting
In Santo Tomas, the Charge had phoned the Foreign Minister to offer
the sympathy of the U. S. people for the people of the Algerobies in
their hour of need. The Poreign Minister expressed his thanks and in-
vited him to lunch that same day. Smith accepted, hoping to learn of
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February 3, 1963
DEPARTMENT OP STATE IMMli.1 199
POLAD CINCPAC PRIORITY 30
DEPARTM1 NT OP DEFENSE IMMEDIATE gm
that luncheon is summarized below in the message which was sent to





1. POMIN LOPEZ QOMM AT LUNCH TODAY STATEi* GOA PRESENTLY HAS NO PLANS
REQUEST USG AID.
2. LOPEZ STATE l; GOA ABLE ADMINISTER ALL RELIEF ISO BUT INDICATED
PULL EXTINT DAMAGE STILL UNKNOWN TO GOA.
3. LOCAL RED CROSS PRESIDENT CUERVO ALSO PRESENT ADIMD NOTHING TO ABOVE.
4. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES ON BACCALA NOT YET RESTORED. EMBASSY
EFFORTS COMPLLTE CHECK VELPARE AMLRICAN CITIZENS CONTINUING. CROSSDECK
(ALUSNA) ATEEMPTED PLY TO NUEVA AGUILA APELRNOON FEBRUARY 3 TO INQUIRE
.vELPARE/VMFREABOUES AMERICAN CITIZENS BUT WUVLNTED BY Brt. ttft.
5. ENROUTE AIRPORT CROSSDECK TENSIVE DAMAGE URBANIZACION LAS LOMA5
AND VILLAGE LOS GATOS. LOS GATOSAOS PESCADORES ROAD IMPASSABLE ACCORDING
HIS REPORTS. EMBASSY HAS CERTAIN INFORMATION LAS COLINAS ASj EL CARIBE
SECTIONS SANTO TOMAS INTACT OR VERY LIGHTLY DAMAGED.
SMITH
CONFIDENTIAL
While the Charge lunched with the Foreign Minister, the Embassy
had been receiving a steady stream of damage reports from a wide variety
of sources, including two Embassy officers whom he had instructed to make
a first-hand survey of local conditions.
The Naval Attache had been instructed to fly to Nueva Aguila and
investigate the welfare of American citizens employed at the Diamond
Chocolate Company, a U. S. company with a large plant in that city. The
4
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An officer of the C. I. A.
in Santo Toms. A summary of their reports was included in the
5The Assistant Attache sent a report with the sane information to
hie owe agency,
message which the Charge drafted after his lunch with the Foreign
Minister.
Closing a Case
As the Assistant Attache concluded his report to the Charge,
(department Message *9J concerning Fanny Jogoouer was delivered. For-
tunately, telephone communications with Molto and Tiki had been restored,
so that a telephone call to the residence of Miss Dogooder sufficed. The
Second Secretary/Administrative Officer, who made the phone call, was
informed that Miss Dogooder had departed on the day previous for her
annual vacation in Perth, Australia. The message apprising the Depart-





DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIORITY 10Q
INFO; AMBMBASSY CANBERRA 18
UEPTEL 93
FANNY DOGOODER DEPARTED NUEVA AGUILA 2 PEB FOR ANNUAL VACATION PERTH,
AUSTRALIA.
SMITH
With the restoration of telephone service to Molto and Tiki, the
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only a sleepy watchman, but the Charge was able to obtain the home
telephone number of the plant manager. A call to the manager's home
supplied the information that seismic disturbances on Molto had been
slight. The plant had functioned normally that day with all employees
present.
Later that night, Department Telegram «f94 was delivered to the
Charge. This, he felt, required no immediate action, because his latest
message to the Department, 4199, had indicated that U. 5. aid would not
be required.
The fcajbassy staff continued making phone calls into the early
morning hours, trying to assure the welfare of American citizens, until,
at last, they departed for their homes ana a well-earned rest.
In Washington, shortly before eight o'clock on the morning of
February 4, the Algerobian desk officer arrived in his Department office.
Starting with his usual stack of correspondence, he noted copies of
telegrams #199 and #200 from the field. Their contents had been phoned
to him during the night by the Department Operations Center. Aith
telegram #200 in hand, the desk officer called the Baptist Missionary
Society and eased their concern for Miss Dogooder. The phone call
following this to Senator Hoople advised him of the information given
to the Baptist Missionary Society and ended his concern in the matter.
One case was closed.
The desk officer then attendee the Assistant Secretary's morning
staff conference with his Office Director, curing the conference, the
contents of telegram #199 were discussed* ana it was agreed to hold
assistance plans in abeyance pending a specific request from the field.






"in gaiftion %At ac
jtoeis la-
' 9rft : airi o*
yi«noieeiM taitqj* »d3 t>»Xl«d '*»*






^»n art* Nt* jewipvs «»q« « inlba*q •oiwy*** al an*i >»!»••
tv> tot* *rr
A New Facet
Shortly after the end of the staff conference, the desk officer
received a phone call from the Executive Vice President of the Diamond
Chocolate Company in New York, He inquired about the status of company
personnel and property in Nueva Aguila, because he had been unable to
talk to the Nueva Aguila plant by telephone. It was mentioned that a
company ship with factory spare parts and supplies would be departing
from New York in three days and that any food or medicines required by
company personnel could be added to its cargo.
Because he had no knowledge of damage on Molto or Tiki, the desk
officer could only reply that he would send a cable to the .Embassy at
Santo Tomas and request them to investigate the status of the diamond
Chocolate Company personnel and property. He further assured the
executive vice president that his company would be advised in this
matter as soon as a reply was made. The desk officer therefore drafted




ACTION; AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 95
EMBTEL 197
EXEC VICE PRES DIAMOND CHOCOLATE N. 1. CONCERNED SAFETY NUEVA AGUILA
PERSONNEL AND PLANT. STATES SS DIAMOND BAR DEPARTING N. Y. FEB 7 FOR
NUEVA AGUILA WITH FACTORY SPARES AND SUPPLIES. SPACE AVAILABLE 4 LONG



















How the Mighty Arc Fallen
Embassy personnel arrived even earlier than usual in Santo Tomas
and resumed the business of determining the status of American personnel
whom they had been, as yet, unable to contact. This process was well
under way when a phone call from the Foreign Minister informed the Charge
that the Algerobian President desired to see him at 9
:
00 a #m. in the
Presidential Palace. A summary of the meeting which ensued was forwarded






ACTION; DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO. POLAD CINCPAC
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HOTELS 198 AND 199. DEPTEL 94.
1. GONIVO CALLED ME TO PALACE THIS MORNING AND GAVE ME PRELIMINARY"
DAMAGE REPORT IN PRESENCE POMIN AND PRES RED CROSS.
2. HIS INFORMATION INDICATES 127 DEAD AND 348 INJURED, NONE AMERICAN.
APPROXIMATELY 10,000 HOMELESS. ALL CASUALTIES BACCALA. CASUALTIES
CONTINUING MOUNT. KNOWN DAMAGE ESTIMATED 16 MILLION PESOS. NO LOOTING
OR CIVIL DISORDER REPORTED. NO DAMAGE REPORTED MOLTO OR TIKI. EMBASSY
HAS COMPLETED INVESTIGATION STATUS U. S. CITIZENS IN ALL PARTS ALGEROBIES,
NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR WANT TO AN/ AMERICAN CITIZENS HERE KNOWN EMBASSY.
3. GONIVO URGENTLY REQUESTS 3 U. S. HELICOPi .LP ASSESS UUtt
DAMAGE. ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE POR U. S. RELIEF ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY
MEDICINTS. STATED REQUEST WOULD BE MADE IN WRITING THIS AFTERNOON. I
SAID I VOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO DEPARTMENT.
4. ARCHBISHOP GOMEZ VEGAS REQULSTED ASSISTANCE CATHOLIC RELIEP SOCIEIY
THROUGH PAPAL NUNCIO ALFREDO 9*11X1.
5. IN VIEW FOREGOING AND TRADITIONAL U. S. FRIENDSHIP ALGEROBIAN PEOPLE
I RECOMMEND FOLLOWING ACTION;
A. PROVIDE ASAP 3 HELICOPTERS POR DAMAGE SURVEY IN COOPERATION
WITH ALGEROBIAN ARMED FORCES.
B. AIRLIFT RED CROSS DISASTER EVALUATION TEAM IMMEDIATELY.
- 117 -















C. AID/3 CONSULT U. S. HEADQUARTERS CATHOLIC RELIEF SOCIErY TO
COORDINATE POSSIBLE SHIPMENTS EMERGENCY POOD SUPPLIES AND MEDICINES.
D. RECOMMEND SHIP TYPHUS VACCINE SUFFICIENT HALF MILLION PEOPLE,
SUPPLY HALIZONE TABLETS, PENICILLIN, ASSORTED DISINFECTANT, ANw
BANDAGES.
6. FURTHER DETAILS THIS CONVERSATION FOLLOW SEPTEL.
7. CROSSDECK INTENDS OVERFLY BACCALh WITH SEVERAL GOA OFFICIALS AS
PASSENGERS TO MAKE PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE TODAY WEATHER PERMUTING.
SMITH
CONFIDENTIAL
In addition to the above message, the following self-explanatory
telegram was sent separately.
SECRET













1. DURING COURSE MEETING GONIVO REPORTED RLFfEL POMIN TOLD Mfi HE HAS
RECEIVED TELEGRAMS FROM MAO TSE TUNG AND KHRUSHCHEV OFFERING POOD,
MEDICINES, AND DAMAGE SURVEY TEAMS.
2. GONIVO STATED HE HAS POLITELY REPUSED BOTH OFFERS.
3. IN VIEW GONIVO' S PAST ANr I-COMMUNIST RECORD, I SURMISE HE IS UNWILLING
OPEN WAY COMMUNIST PENErRATION ALGEROBIES.
4. LITTLE SYMPATHY HERE PEOPLE CHINESE EXTRACTION FOR CHICOM GOVT.
3, AS DEPT A /ARE, SUCH REMAINING MEMBERS COMMUNIST PARTY ALGEROBIES
AS MAY EXIST COMPLETEEY UNDERGROUND SINCE 1961 LYNCHINGS BUT MIGHT RISK
SURFACING IP KHRUSHCHEV AID ACCEPTED.
6. LIKELY NEUTRALIST INDIAN AND APRICAN PRESS WOULD CRITICISE REJECTION
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7. IN ORDER CLEARLV DEMONSTRATE U. S. INTEREST IN rfSLMUU PEOPLE
ALGEROBII S IN THEIR HOUR OF NEED, I BELIEVL ,vt SHOULD BE 111 I NILINS IN
TERMS OP A MAXIMUM IMPACT PROGRAM CONSISTENT AlTH EXTENT DAfc/VGE,
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW COMMUNIST OPPERS AS *EIGHEi> AGAINST OVERALL U. S.
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ALGKROBIiS.
SMITH
SECRET
*hile the Charge conferred with Dr. Gonivo at the Palacio Blanco,
the Embassy staff was able to account for the remaining known American
citizens in the Algerobies. This information was included in telegram
201 to the Department.
Improved weather permitted the Naval Attache, the Assistant Attache,
and several Algerobian officials to conduct an aerial survey of damaged
areas. The Algerobian Government's one ancient airplane also flew on a
similar mission.
The written request from the Algerobian Government to the United
States for helicopter assistance in damage assessment was delivered to
the Embassy early in the afternoon of February 4. A copy of that request,
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A formal Request for the Assistance of the U. s. Government from the
AXgerobian Government
(Text translated from the Spanish original)
REPUBLICA U£ LAS ISLAS ALGEROBIAS
Ministerio de Ncgocios Extranjeros
Plaza de la Independencia
Santo Tomas de Baccala
4 de Febrero de 1963
I refer to your kind expression of sympathy for the stricken
people of the Algerobian Islands on behalf of the people of our great
sister Republic of North America.
Sensible of the oft-expressed generosity and understanding of the
American people for their less fortunate fellow creatures, and mindful
of the traditional friendship which for these many years so happily has
animated the intercourse between the United States of North America
and the Republic of the Algerobian Islands, the Government of the
Algerobian Islands has the honor to appeal to the noble and altruistic
policies which guide the Government of the United States in order to
make formal request that three United States helicopters be despatched
as soon as possible to the Algerobian Islands in order that an aerial
survey may be conducted of the Island of Baccala to ascertain the extent
of the damage inflicted by the disastrous earthquake which so cruelly
struck the Algerobian Islands on February 3, 1963.
The Government of the Algerobian Republic sincerely trusts that
its appeal will be received and acted upon by the Government of the
United States in the same spirit of comprehension and friendship which
the peoples of the world have come to anticipate from the leader of the
Christian world.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Francisco leof ilo Lopez Conde
John H. Smith, Esquire
Charge d* Affaires Ad Interim
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Progress of the New Facet
Embassy message #201 crossed the Department* s telegram #95 in
transmission. The contents of the newly-arrived message were phoned
to the manager of the Diamond Chocolate Company at Nueva Aguila by the
Second Secretary/Economic Officer. The gist of the conversation which
ensued between them can best be determined from the following telegram.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
FEBRUARY 4, 19b3
ACTION: DEPARTMENT OP STATE IMMEDIATE 203
DEPTEL 95
MANAGUR DIAMOND CHOCOLATE NUEVA AGUILA STATES OPERATIONS NORMAL PLANT




Embassy telegrams #201 and #202 were received in the late after-
noon in Washington. Message *201 was distributed in the Department to
the Secretary, Under Secretary, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Assistant Secretary, Office Director, desk officer, the concerned A. I. o.
hierarchy, and other interested federal agencies. Telegram #202,
because of its "LIMDIS" caption, received a more restricted distribution
on a strict "need-to-know" basis in the Department's cnain of command.
The White House, naturally, received copies of both telegrams. After a
brief conference with their Assistant Secretary, the Office Director and
the desk officer held a phone conference with I. S. A.
It was determined in the course of this conference that it would
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of their limited range. Purther, it was not feasible to send helicopters
from Long Beach or Pearl Harbor by ship because this would consume too
much time. However, Task Group 98.2, composed of 1 A. 5. *. carrier6
An aircraft carrier configured for anti-subnarine warfare. Written
in naval communications as CVS.
and 5 destroyers, was conducting training operations 150 miles north of
New Zealand in an ANZUS exercise which was nearly completed. The
carrier, with a normal complement of 14 helicopters and 28 fixed-wing
aircraft, could reach Santo Tomas in about 3 days. Lven if 3 helicopters
were available in closer proximity, there were no maintenance facilities
available for them in Santo Tomas. Further, a carrier and her aircraft
in the harbor of Santo Tomas would supply a demonstrable American
presence. Por these reasons, it was decided that dispatching the carrier
offered the best solution to the problem, provided that this solution
would be acceptable to Che Algerobian Government.
The desk officer then conferred with his A. I. J. counterpart,
briefing him on what bad thus far transpired. Together they phoned the
national headquarters of the Catholic Relief Society, where it was learned
that an adequate supply of the medicines requested by telegram <?2Q1 was
already being prepared for immediate air shipment.
After ascertaining the medical supply shipping data, the desk officer
telephoned the U. S. Red Cross headquarters. Here he learned that the
International Red Cross headquarters at Geneva had been requested by the
Algerobian Government to send a disaster evaluation team and was acceding
to that request.
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With all of these considerations in mind, the desk officer briefed
his Office director. Then, jointly, they drafted the message below,
which was cleared by their Assistant Secretary and transmitted.
C O N P I U fc N T I A L
PBBRUAAY 4, 1963
ACTION. AMBMBASSY SANTO TOMAS IMMEDIATE M
INFO. POLAD CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 820
BMBTELS 201 and 202
1. CONCUR YOUR ANALYSIS REPTEL 202.
2. USS I fCVS-72) CONDUCING TRAINING 150 MILES NORTH NEW ZEALAND
ONLY PEASIBLE SOURCE HILICOPTERS AND HELICOPTER MAlNfENANCE.
3. YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED INFORM GOA BUT USG DESIRES ACCEi>E ITS
REQUEST FOR 3 HELICOPTERS CONDUCT SURVEY DAMAGED AREAS. NAVY PREPARED
JESPATCH EUTA/i 4ITH HELICOPTER SQUADRON EMBARKED TO SANTO TOMAS ARRIVING
FEBRUARY 7.
4. EUIA* CAN MAINTAIN 4 HELICOPTERS CONTINUOUSLY AIRBORNE DAYLIGHT HOURS,
5. REQUEST YOU INFORM GOA AND, IF AGREEABLE, ARRANGE ClEhRA^ES FOR
EUTA* AND ESCORTING DESTROYERS HULL AND PREBLE ENTER SANTO fOMAS.
RUSK.
CONFIDENTIAL
The information concerning the Red Cross and Catholic Relief oociety
efforts was forwarded in the separate roe ssages below, drafted by the desk
officer and released by the Office Director.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
FEBRUARY 4, 1903
ACTION. AMEVBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 97
INFO. POLAD CINCPAC 822
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ACTION. AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 98
INTERNATIONAL RLD CROSS GENEVA ADVISES DISASTER EVALUATION TEAM MILL
ARRIVE SANTO TOMAS FEBRUARY 5 gUANTAS PLIGHT 400.
RUSK
Ending the New Facet
Later that afternoon, the desk officer received Embassy telegram
#203. After noting its contents, he phoned the Executive Vice President
of the Diamond Chocolate Company in New York and relayed the text to him.
Further Amplification
When the Naval Attache and the Assistant Attache returned from their
flight, they made their report to the Charge, who summarized it in the
following message to the Department.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ACTION. DEPARTMJ NT OF STATE
INFO. POLAD CINCPAC
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT POUCH AMEMBASSY aELLlNGTON/AMEMBASSY CaNBLRRA/AMCONSUL NOUMEA
1. FOLLOWING DAMAGE NOTED BY CROSSDECK FLIGHT THIS AM
A. ALL ROADS NORTH AND EAST OF SANTO TOMAS BLOCKED BY LANDSLIDE*.
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C. ONLY PEW SIGNS LIFE NOTED VILLAGES SAN JUAN AHo LOS PEbcAJURES.
D. MANY PISHING BOATS WRECKED ON BEACHES.
E. PENINSULA GORUA CUT BY SEA.
P. EL VALLE AREA OBSCURED VOLCANIC DUST.
G. SANTA HERMANDAD AREA OBSCURED BY CLOUDS.
2. NO DAMAGE NOTED MOLTO OR TIKI.




ifhen he received Department telegram #96, the Charge phoned the
Ministry of Poreign Affairs for an appointment with Foreign Minister
Lopez, Being advised that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would see him
at any time, Smith went at once to the Ministry and explained the
advantages of a visit by the U.S.S. Eutuw and her two accompanying
destroyers. He emphasized that such a visit would permit continuous
operation of four helicopters, instead of three operating intermittently,
permitting a more rapid survey of damage. It was also suggested that
the destroyers might survey the ports of Baccala.
Poreign Minister Lopez noted, regrettably, that he would not
recommend that shore leave or liberty be granted to the three thousand
ships* personnel in view of the disastrous circumstances prevailing in
Santo Tomas. However, with this understanding, the assistance of the
U, S. Navy would be welcomed. The Poreign Minister promised that he
would convey the results of the conversation to Dr. Gonivo and that
clearances for the ships could be considered granted as of that moment,
although this would be confirmed by note to follow shortly,
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With these assurances, the Charge left the ministry and returned
to the Embassy, where he sent the following message.
CONFIDENTIAL
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
ACTION; I'AKTMENT OP STATE IMMEDIATE 205
INFO. POLAD CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 34
DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE IMMEDIATE DM
DEPTEL 96
1. POMIN GRANTED VERBAL CLEARANCE KttSK, HULL, PREBLE ENTER SANTO TOMAS.
WILL CABLE TEXT IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. ADVISE ETA EUTAW AND DLsfROYEuo.
2. POMIN SUGGESTS NO LIBERTY OR SHORE LEAVE BE GRANTED PERSONNEL EUTAW
AND DESTROYERS. I CONCUR.
3. IF FEASIBLE, RECOMMEND HULL AND PRiBLE BE UTILIZED SURVEY WATERS
PORTS OF SANTO TOMAS AND LOS PESCADORES.
SMITH
CONFIDENTIAL
The text of the note in which Foreign Minister Lopez Conde expressed
effusive thanks and granted clearance to the ships was sent to the Depart-
ment later. Its text was couched in flowery terms similar to the note
in which he had requested helicopter assistance.
The Charge also telephoned the Papal Nuncio, Archbishop Gomez Vegas,
and the Algerobian Red Cross office once more, expressing sympathy and
advising that Red Cross and Catholic Relief Society assistance would
soon arrive in Santo Tomas.
Department of Defense Action
It was nearly midnight when message #205 arrived in the Department
of State Operations Center. Telegram #204 had been received late that
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decided that it required no immediate action. Telegram *205, however,
required immediate attention, and, complying with their instructions,
the Operations Center telephoned the desk officer at his home and para-
phrased its contents.
In turn, the desk officer phoned his I. S. A. contact, who had
already been awakened with a report of the same message by the depart-
ment of Defense Communications Center. The colonel advised the desk
officer that a message directing the three ships to proceed to Santo
Tomas would be sent immediately. It was also agreed that the two
destroyers could conduct the port survey but that it would cease with
the completion of the helicopter survey to permit all ships to depart
from Santo Tomas in company. As a result of this conversation, the
following message was originated in the Department of defense, directing
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to send the naval units to
the Aigerobies. A similar message from the Department informed the
Attache, directly, of the approximate arrival time of the naval units
and their instructions.
CONFIDENTIAL













1. DIK DIVERT EUTAms, HULL, AND PRLBLE PRESENT OPS PROCEED SANTO T0MA6
D£ BACCALA BEST SUSTAINED SPEED. CLNC ARRANGED. RETAIN OPCON.
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2. EUTAW CHOPPERS ASSIST ALGLROBIAN GOVT SURVEY LARTHsRJAkE AND VOLCANIC
DAMAGE POR PERIOD ABOUT ONE ALEX.
3. HULL AND PREBLE CONDUCT SURVEY MOMS SANTO TOMAS AND LOS PMCAMMM,
COMPLETE OR CEASE THIS SURVEY TO DEPART IN COMPANY WITH EUTA*.
4. NO SHORE LV OR LIB AUTH.
5. EXPENDITURES CHARGEABLE MN 1357256482 NAVY.
6. ADVISE ALUSNA ASAP ETA SANTO TOMAS.
7. DIRLAUTH ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS.
CONFIDENTIAL
The above message, when received by the Commander-in-Chief , Pacific
Fleet, prompted the message following.
CONFIDENTIAL














1. POR CTG. 98.2. SHIFT FLAG BARNEY AND PROCEED lArt ANNEX BRAVO MY
OPORD 9-63. CHANGE 9 WILL POL.
2. POR EUTA.'.'. PROCEED .VITH HULL AND PREBLE MAX SUSTAINED SPEED POINr
PEDRO WHERE RI FUEL PROM SHIAWASSEE. THEN PROCEED SANTO TOMAS IAW REF A.
3. MAKE DAILY SITREPS IA.V ANNEX ROMEO MY OPORD 7-63 WITH CNO ACflON
ADDEE DEPT OF STATE INFO ADDEE.
CONFIDENTIAL
The message above insured that the carrier and her accompanying


















also directed that daily situation reports be sent to the Department
of Defense and the Department of State.
leather permitting, Eutaw and her escorts could reach Santo Tomas
in sixty-eight hours steaming time from her position north of New
Zealand. The ANZUS training exercise previously mentioned had been
completed, and the task group was already proceeding at normal cruising
speed for Pearl Harbor. Because Eutaw* s meteorologist forecast calm
seas and unlimited visibility, her commanding officer sent the message
which follows to Santo Tomas.














UNCLAS. ETA SANTO TOMAS LIGHT EUTni, HULL, AND PREBLE 080400Z. iU.^
PILOTS 4MB ANCHORAGES. PRATIQUE CERTIFIED.
External Jate-Time Groups
For those not versed in the technicalities of Greenwich Mean Time,
the above message indicates that the three ships would arrive at 5*00 P.M.
local Algerobian time on February 7. The request for anchorages and
pilots is obvious, especially where a commanding officer is not familiar
with the harbor that he plans to enter.
The three vessel messages were received at the Embassy late on the
night of February 4 while the Charge and his staff were working their
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usual late hours. After the Charge read them, he decided that replies
could be deferred until the following morning.
On the dav following, the Charge called Foreign Minister Lopez
Conde and informed him when the three ships would arrive. He suggested
that the usual honors and ceremonies be dispensed with in view of the
current national difficulties. The Foreign Minister agreed. Meanwhile,
the Naval Attache completed telephone arrangements for harbor pilots
and anchorages with the Captain of the Port. Then, together, the Charge
and the Naval Attach^ drafted the message below, which was sent to the
Eutaw.
PPPPP 06<>015Z GR 56










CINCPACFLT PASS TO EUTA*
1. PILOTS AT SANK) rOMAS LIGHT.





3. NO SALUTES OR HONORS.
4. HARBOR OCT K9B.
MUELLE RATON LIGHT 1750 YDS
MUELLE RATO\ LIGHT 1500 Yl»S
MUELLE RATON LIG 1625 *L>S
Note here that the Embassy did not communicate directly with the
distant ships but resorted to requesting a shore establishment to pass
the messages. Because operational control was retained by the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, his command would be maintaining constant
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With their anchorages assigned and pilots provided, the ships could,
and did, enter harbor and anchor without fanfare. In a similar business-
like manner, the naval units conducted their surveys, making daily
situation reports to the Chief of Naval Operations and the department,
in coordination with the U. S. Embassy, Santo Tomas. A sample situation
report, the final one, is shown below.
CONFIDENTIAL




INFO. DEPT OF STATE
ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS (BY HAND)
HULL
PREBLE
REF. A. CINCPACPLT 050703^
B. ANNEX ROMEO CINCPACPLT OPORD 7-63
PINAL SITREP
CONFIDENTIAL
1. 22 SORTIES COMPLETED THIS DATE. TOTAL NR. SORTIES THIS OP 137.
2. DAMAGED AREA NOTED THIS DATE FOL
:
A. SAN ISIDRO. 25 PERS REMAIN OF 170. ONLY 7 HABITABLE DWELLINGS
REMAIN.
B. SAN IGNACIO. 150 PERS REMAIN OF 165. ALL DUELLINGS INTACT.
C. LOS Jl-SU ITAS. NO DAMAGE.
D. SAN PABLO. NO DAMAGE.




4. HULL AND PREBLE SURVLf COMPLETED. NO BOTTOM DISPLACEMENT NOTED
HARBORS.
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A Request for Aid
As the list of casualties mounted, an attitude of dismay and
apprehension permeated the Algerobian Government* ^r. Gonivo proclaimed
a state of national emergency and suspended certain portions of his new
constitution. Some units of the armed forces and the Cuerpo de Bomberos
were organized into labor batallions to open the roads. Other units of
the armed forces and the police maintained patrols in the stricken areas
to prevent looting and civil disorder. The hospitals were crowded to
capacity as the doctors labored "around the clock" to tend the injured.
Burial squads interred the bodies recovered from the rubble to maintain
a semblance of sanitation. Both the Red Cross and the Catholic Relief
Society worked to alleviate the suffering.
In this atmosphere, the distraught dictator summoned the charge and
informed him that the Algerobian Republic urgently needed emergency food.
Existing stocks could not support the present demand much longer. Jr.
Gonivo therefore requested that the United States give emergency food
to the people of the Algerobian Republic and presented the Charge a
written request. Smith replied that the request would be forwarded to




ACTION; DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMEDIATE 206
INFO: POLAD CINCPAC PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE PRIORITY
EMBTEL 202
1. GONIVO SUMMONED M PALACIO THIS MORNING AND ADVISED ME LOCAL SUPPLIES
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2. H£ PRESENTED REQUEST FOR LMERGENC If POOu COMMENTING irUI UNLESS POJO
*ERE MADE AVAILABLE SOON, POPULACE *OULD D CfiD TO SAtRVAi'ION.
APTER EXPRESSING APPROPRIATE SYMPATHY FOR ALGERQBIAN PEOPLE, I REPLIED
I WOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO USG.
3. LOCAL CATHOLIC RELIEP SOCIETY REQUESTING POOD SHIPMENT PROM CRS
UNITED SrATES.
4. POR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AS WELL AS POLITICAL CCNSI DERATIONS DISCUS.
REPTEL I RECOMMEND.
A. AIR SHIPMENT 50 TONS TITLE II EMERGENCY FOODSTUFFS WITH FOLLOW
ON OCEAN SHIPMENT 3500 TONS.
B. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION THESE EMERGENCY FOODSTUPFS BE MADE THROUGH
CRS ORGANIZATION IN ALGEROBIES AS SIMPLEST AND MOST EFFICACIOUS METHOD
POR THEIR DISTRIBUTION ALGEROBIAN PEOPLE AND ALSO BUTTRESS POSITION
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH ANu MINIMIZE POLITICAL DIVIiiENJS vHICH OTHERWISE
rfOULD ACCRUE GONIVO GOVERNMENT.
5. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED rtILL CONVEY FIRST PERSON NOTE BWMMSIW




The note which requested food from the U. S. Government was
substantially the same as that which requested helicopter assistance.
For this reason, it will not be repeated here.
In the telegram above, the Charge's recommendation to distribute
the food through the Algerobian Catholic Relief Society was made for
several reasons. First, the people of the Algerobies are Roman Catholics;
even those of Chinese extraction are now. Second, they have already done
extensive relief work in the area and are familiar with local customs.
Third, the introduction of another relief agency would only serve to
complicate the distribution of relief — the Algerobians would be sus-
picious of unfamiliar organizations, and the Catholic Relief Society
might be unwilling to cooperate with rivals in relief administration.
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Fourth, it could be expected that political dividends would be reaped
by the current U. S. administration by its seeming support of the
Catholic Relief Society, when, la fact, no official li. 5. support for
that organization is intended or can be construed. The use of the
Catholic Relief Society as a distributing agency is a matter of practical
expediency.
tfhen it was distributed in the Department in the late afternoon,
telegram ^206 from the Embassy caused a flurry of activity. The Office
Director went to his Assistant Secretary, who assented to the recommen-
dations made in the message and directed his Deputy Assistant Secretary
to obtain approval in principle for the use of A. I. D. funds from the
Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Par Bast, A. I. *>., and to advise
the Office Director of the results. In this manner a political decision
fixing policy had been made.
Because the same telegram had been distributed to the cognizant
A. I. D. hierarchy, the Assistant Administrator had already obtained an
allotment of >100,000 from contingency funds to support the project by
the time that the Deputy Secretary phoned him. These funds, the Assistant
Administrator considered, would be more than ample to cover the shipping
cost of Title II food to the Higerobies. The Assistant Administrator
also indicated that the Director, Voluntary Foreign Aid Service, A. I. D.,
would coordinate the project for his agency, because that office main-
tained liaison with all voluntary relief organizations, including the
Catholic Relief Society.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary then called his Office Director,
whom he briefed on the progress of the project, and directed him to insure
that the desk officer was made aware of what had thus far transpired.
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He added that he or the Assistant Secretary would "sign off" on the
message which advised the Embassy of arrangements for the food ship-
ment.
In the meanwhile, the desk officer had phoned his I. 6. A. contact
and determined that the two cargo aircraft initially discussed could
still be made available. He appraised his Office Director of their
availability and was, in turn, informed of the progress made by senior
officials in the matter.
The director. Voluntary Foreign Aid Services, a. I. u, t then
telephoned the desk officer to consult him on implementation, ihe
Director noted that the Catholic Relief Society headquarters had advised
him that they would be willing to arrange ocean shipping and distribution
of 3,500 tons of emergency food if funas could be made available to defray
the shipping costs. The desk officer suggested that the Director draft
a letter to the Catholic Relief Society authorizing an expenditure of
funds for food shipment costs. This letter should indicate that its
contents were not to be disclosed in the Aigerobies. The desk officer
also requested that he be notified of shipping arrangements.
When arrangements were completed, the desk officer drafted the
message below, which was initialed by the Office Director and released





AMEMBASSY SANTO TOKAS IMMEul 99
INFO: POUU> CINCPAC PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIORITY
EMBTEL 206
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2. 50 TONS EMERG POOD WILL ARRIVE SANTO TOMAS PEBRUAR* 11 IN TrfO
USAF C-135 AIRCRAPT FOR DISTRIBUTION SANTO TOMAS. ARRANGE AND ADVISE
CLEARANCES.
3. 3,500 TONS POOD DEPARTS Ml FRANCISCO FEBRUARY 13 SS MATSONLA
ARRIVING SANTO TOMAS FEBRUARY 22.
4. ALL SHIPMENTS MARKED FOR JUAN MOLINO C/O CRS SANTO TOMAS.
MMK
CONFIDENTIAL
tfhcn he received the above message from the Department on the
morning of February 7, the Charge phoned Archbishop Gomez Vegas and
outlined the Departments arrangements for the emergency food supplies.
The Archbishop expressed his gratitude for the prompt and generous
response of the United States, adding that he would appreciate the
Charge* s assistance in obtaining government trucks to distribute the
food. He said that his personal approach to Dr. Gonivo had been made
difficult by his refusal to offer a Te Deua in his cathedral after the
failure of the latest assassination attempt on the life of Dr. Gonivo.
The Charge then arranged to be received at the i'alacio Blanco by
Dr. Gonivo and his Foreign Minister. They, too, expressed their thanks
for the generosity of the United States Government and assured the Charge
that clearances for the U. S. A. F. aircraft would be arranged immediately.
Dr. Gonivo then suggested that the helicopters, due to arrive that day,
night be employed in distributing emergency food after the survey of
damage was completed. To this the Charge replied that the request would
have to be transmitted to the Department, where it would receive consid-
eration. However, plans for distribution should be formulated utilizing
locally available means of transportation in the event that the defense
requirements of the United States necessitated that the carrier and her
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embarked aircraft be required elsewhere. In addition, the Charge
expressed the hope that the Algerobian Government would make trucks
available to the Catholic Relief Society to assist in the distribution
of the foodstuffs. After some moments of hesitation, Dr. Gonivo assented
and directed the Foreign Minister to tell the chief of the armed forces
to arrange the details with the Archbishop.
In the manner which has been demonstrated in this chapter, the
Charge reported the gist of this conference at the Palacio Blanco to
the Department, recommending against food distribution by helicopter
because of the availability of idle and more suitable Algerobian
Government vehicles. Naturally, the Department concurred in the Charge's
recommendation, and its decision declining the suggestion was subsequently
given to Dr. Gonivo.
The note expressing the sympathy of the people of the United States
for the people of the Algerobies is copied below.
EMBASSY OP THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA
. laze, de los Proceres




I have the honor to join my expression of deep sympathy with those
of my Government for the people of the Island of BaccaTa who have been
so tragically afflicted by the earthquake which struck the Algerobian
Islands on February 3.
I wish to assure Your Excellency that the people of the United States
stand ready to render appropriate humanitarian assistance to the people
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Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
Charge d'Affaires Ad Interim
His Excellency
Francisco Teof ilo Lopez donde
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Santo Tomas de Baccala
Notice that every expression of sytapathy is for the people and
not the government — a polite way of hinting that the United States
does not approve of the Gonivo regime.
Summary
Cven though relations between the Aigerobian Republic and the
United States initially were strained, the United States Governments
response to requests for help, out of humanitarian considerations,
presaged improving relations. Ihe United States gained from the
catastrophe.
United States help did not enhance the stature of the Gonivo regime,
despite his later wild claims. People could see plainly the 'J. S.
markings on the aircraft which located the injured and the carrier from
which those aircraft operated. Ihere were plain indications of U. S.
aid on the food packages which were distributed to the people by priests
and lay workers of the catholic ttelief Society and not by officials of
the oppressive Gonivo Administration. Lvtn use of Algerobian Government
trucks for distribution dio little to add to Gonivo* s image.
The manner in which the aid was rendered permitted minimum U. S.
involvement with the Gonivo Government and buttressed the position of
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It might be said that selfish national interest motivated he
entice policy of the United States in this example — especially- after
considering the Russian and Chinese Communist interest displayed in the
Aigerobian earthquake. However, it must be admitted that selfish
national interest was reinforced by altruism. Pew nations permit con-
sideration of altruistic reasons in the formulation of foreign policy.
That the United States does, is, perhaps, ?>art of its greatness.
The success of the policy described cannot be easily measured
unless the hundreds of letters of thanks which Algerobians sent to the
Bmbassy or the words of thanks expressed to the Charge on the street
can be used as criteria. The local press no longer prints anti-United
States sentiments, and the Charge is now welcomed in government circles,
The presence of the U. S. Navy ships in Santo Tomas signalled
other nations of U. S. interest in the Algerobies and of a willingness
to commit forces to maintain our interest.
The final test of the policy's success remains to be determined
by the course of events which follow in the wake of that policy, tfho
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CHAPTER VIII
ENHANCIhG THE ROLE OP THE COUNTR* uLSK OFFICER
Time and again in bearings before the Jackson Subcommittee the
problem of layering between the Secretary ami the desk officer has been
discussed. A common example of message action, which might seem extreme
to the uninitiated, was previously delineated in this paper. Previous
comment also suggested a necessity for placing responsibility and
authority in the hands of individuals who will be expected to use it
and holding them strictly accountable for its use. The multiplicity
of committees and diffusion of responsibility suggests a tendency toward
downgrading the position of the individual. Henry A. Kissinger suggests
that the insecurity of our policy makers leads them to seek the advice
of ad hoc committees.
*Henry S. Kissinger, "The Policymaker and the Intellectual," The
Reporter . XXXIX (March 5, 1W9).
There is, then, a need for a determined effort in the department
to consolidate overlapping functions, reduce layering, eliminate useless
committees, and assign clear areas of responsibility.
Secretary Rusk, referring to the regional bureaus, spoke of the
possibility of an experiment to eliminate the office level, upgrade
the desk officer, and strengthen the hand of the Assistant Secretary.
Abolishment of the regional office level would excise a major layer
in the Department's hierarchy. Desk officers would then report directly
to their regional Assistant Secretary. On the basis of general guidance,
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the desk officer could be given greater responsibility for handling
country affairs.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security . Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st session,
December 11, 1963 (Washington-. Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.
Secretary Rusk had given consideration to the problem of layering
well in advance of his remarks concerning its debilitating effects to
the Jackson Subcommittee. At his instance, a study was completed by
the Office of Management on March 6, 1963, which purports to recommend
measures "to make possible a return to the original country officer
3
concept — but in an environment which responds to today's needs.
3Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action
in the Regional Bureaus (Washington: Department of State, 1963), p. 1.
This study, like most others concerned with the organization of the
Department of State, is an attempt to solve personnel problems with
revisions in the bureaucratic machinery. Part of its thesis is to
change the job titles of several ranks in the chain of command in order
to emphasize the roles proposed. In actuality, the changes proposed
are superficial, but they would contribute to the elimination of a
portion of the problems mentioned on the previous page.
Summary of Recommendations
A summary of the recommendations of the Office of Management follows:
1, Concentrate the leadership and action responsibilities
of the desk officer in a new position of Principal Policy
Officer.
2. Locate the Principal Policy Officer immediately
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3. Assign to the Principal Policy Officer responsibility
for one country or a group of countries, depending on the
nature and complexity of country problems.
4. Give the freedom to organize and utilize staff, to
meet his needs as he sees them, to each Principal Policy
Officer.
5. Initiate a one-year program for phasing into the
Principal Policy Officer concept as rapidly as officers
with demonstrated executive and leadership ability are
available for such assignment.
6. designate in each bureau one alter ego Deputy
Assistant Secretary.
7. Restrict functional advisors, and all other officers
outside of the direct chain of command, to advisory ana
liaison roles and reduce the number of those at the bureau
level as the Principal Policy Officer concept is phased
into the bureau organization.
4Ibid
.. p. 3.
Concentrate the Leadership and Action Responsibility of the Desk
Officer in the New Position of Principal Policy Officer .
The Office of Management Staff Study notes that the country desk
officer is too junior in grade and too limited in authority to assume
a major role in the conduct of foreign policy. It further suggests
that until he moves to a place in the bureau structure consonant with
responsibility for the total range of problems, the country desk officer
will not play a leadership and action role. 5 In the course of the many
5
Ibid., p. 4.
departmental reorganizations over the years, the desk officer has moved
farther and farther from the policy level. In crisis or near crisis,
the Office Director or other higher authority assumes control, indicating
- 142 -
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how little the desk officer is expected to contribute to the formulation
of difficult decisions.
Paradoxically, the sane study indicates that desk officers probably
know wore about their countries than anybody in Washington and are, as
a group, hard-working, dedicated, and representative of the most
promising officers in the Foreign Service. This being correct, who,
then, is more qualified to make policy decisions concerning the country <-
As Secretary Rusk said, "It seems to me that the man in Washington
who spends all of his time brooding about a country like Brazil ought
to be a man comparable in competence to the man who is ambassador to
Brazil." This statement indicates that all of the policy sections of
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government operations,
The Secretary of State
.
Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 6.
the department will be composed of chiefs and no Indians. It may be
assumed that Secretary Rusk has country desk officers in the Grades
PSO-1 or PSO-2 in mind.
This position is also paradoxical; because it suggests that the
junior officers, who today deal with matters which before World *ar II
would have been handled by the Secretary of State, are not performing
their duties in a satisfactory manner* or those matters which were
administered by the Secretary of State prior to »orld Mat II are of
minor importance today. Purther, when the Office director or other
higher authority assumes control of all desk matters in a crisis or
near crisis, it would indicate that there is a lack of confidence in
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In actuality, crisis engages attention — that of the Office
Director as well as that of more senior Department officers, with the
attention thus engaged, it is natural for the senior official to
assume more control over every facet of policy. In such cases, the
desk officer does not necessarily become a "fifth wheel." Rather, he
works closely with his Office Director and Assistant Secretary around
the clock in constant telephone and telegraphic communication with the
overseas post. In this activity, he gains requisite experience for
future positions of greater responsibility, and bis superiors can judge
his performance under pressure.
If the desk officer were of an FSO-1 or FSo-2 grade with commen-
surate experience in dealing with affairs of his client country, he
could indeed be expected to initiate policy in crisis and in calm with
minimus supervision, and his participation in policy discussions with
the Assistant Secretary would undoubtedly command greater respect.
The prestige of his enhanced rank would insure more attentiveness
to his policy directions in the interagency meetings that he would chair.
Here he would be expected to provide other agencies with a conceptual
framework around which specialized policy programs could be developed
and to review the effectiveness of the total U. S. efforts in achieving
foreign policy objectives.
In these terms, the Principal Policy Officer (suggested new name for
the desk officer) would supply the elusive elements of leadership and
responsibility presently so diffused below the Assistant Secretary level.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the Principal Policy Officer's
responsibilities require competence and experience coupled with empirical
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counterpart of the ambassador. Selection for Principal Policy Officer
requires that personnel efficiency reports be adequate and honest, in
order to bring the best men to the top and excise the dead wood.
It is implicit that the present desk officer would become an
assistant to the Principal Policy Officer, still doing the pick and
shovel work, and gaining in experience for the day when he would become
a Principal Policy Officer.
Locate the Principal Policy Officer Imreediately Under the Assistant
Secretary
.
By reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary, the Principal
Policy Officer can best provide strong leadership and facilitate action.
The level at which he reports will breed an intimacy and familiarity
with the mind of the Assistant Secretary, permitting informed exercise
of delegated authority. In time, psychic bond will replace the necessity
for much of the present consultation required.
Both the Staff Study and Assistant Secretary Harriman suggest that
the desk officer should be in such accord with his Assistant Secretary
that he would be able to function as a deputy to the Assistant Secretary
for his client country, acting in all natters of consequence and keeping
the Assistant Secretary informed of his progress and any noteworthy
events. To create this atmosphere, a close and easy access to the
Assistant Secretary is required.
Two unnecessary supervisory layers between the desk officer and
the Assistant Secretary would be expunged. Every effort expended to
effect this proposal is well worth while. The chart following illustrates
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From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus
,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).
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Assign to the Principal Policy Officer Responsibility for One Country
or £ Group of Countries Spending; on the Nature and Complexity of
Country Problems
.
"Span of control limitations coupled with the importance of avoiding
layering between the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Policy Officer
will require many ~ perhaps most —• Principal Policy Officers to cover
more than one country. Countries whose problems are critical and
demanding, such as Cuba, are a full load for one Principal Policy
Officer, Countries whose political situations are relatively stable
and in which U. S. involvement is less complex can usefully be grouped.
In some cases, existing office groupings may well continue under a
Principal Policy Officer, or may even be enlarged." 7
•7
Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action
in the Regional Bureaus (Washington
:
department of State, 1963), p. 7,
The above paragraph summarized the new guise of the Office Director,
despite any platitudinous remarks to the contrary. The concept expressed
above negates the concept of the country team in Washington by not
carrying out the principle of one Principal Policy Officer per country
to its logical conclusion. Admittedly, some countries have stable
political situations wherein U. S, involvement is less complex, but the
implication that the Principal Policy Officer for one such country would
not be fully occupied seems utterly incredible. Those hours not absorbed
in the pressure of business could be utilized in thought — thought about
what to do and how best to do it. Being under less pressure, the
Principal Policy Officer for a stable country would be more perceptive
to hints of change in that country. Advance planning could be more
readily accomplished, and the area of surprise might be reduced.
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Further, the mere fact that U. S. relations with a particular
country are presently quiescent is no guarantee that they will remain
so* Pew foresaw, if in actuality they really did, the state to which
relations with Panama would degenerate in such a short span of time.
It may be suspected that one of the factors motivating change is
an excess of Foreign Service officers in senior grades. Secretary Rusk
has admitted that one of the problems of the career Foreign Service is
dealt with in the military services by the up-or-out system,8 rihile
gUnited States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security
.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 83th Congress, 1st Session,
December 11, 1963 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.
a select ion-out process does exist, the problem of those who have reached
their ceilings of ability prematurely remains.
It seems to rae that expanding field services could best utilize
such personnel. Permitting them to become entrenched in Washington
would only aggravate the "hump" problem. Utilizing such personnel in the
field would clear the way for up-and-coming officers of recognized talents
and ability to become more quickly involved in the process of policy
making. The utilization of these personnel in the field necessarily
depends on budget limitations. If a sufficiency of funds is not
appropriated to expand field services, then the Congress should be
requested to legislate authorization to prune the Foreign Service as
necessary. Such legislation would, to an extent, be contrary to the
principles of tenure; but tenure, if carried to extremes, encourages
mediocrity. The Foreign Service should be the last harbor of mediocrity.
Its standards should be maintained at a high level of excellence.
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Charts on the following pages show the structure of the Bureau
of Inter-American Affairs as it existed until March, 1964, and the
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From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus
,
Office of Management, Department of State
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From OrganlzinR for Action in the Regional Bureaus ,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).
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Give to Each Principal Policy Officer the Freedom to Organize and
Use Staff to Meet His Needs as He Sees I'nera .
The present office structure, which is cossprised of an aggregate
of desks, has been faulted for a lack of flexibility. Area maps ana
not needs have determined the organization and staffing of the offices.
Just as each President has his own style of doing business, so
Q
United Mates Congress, Senate, committee on Government Operations,
Organizing for National Security , an Interim Report submitted by the
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, 2d Session
(Washington; Government Printing Office, i960), p. 4.
each Principal Policy Officer will have bis own style of business. The
Principal Policy Officer therefore has a need to adapt his office and
procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style. This proposal suggests
giving him wide latitude in organizing and staffing his office, applying
those managerial principles which he feels are saliently appropriate to
his special circumstances. Supposedly, routine tasks will be assigned
to more junior personnel, while demanding tasks will be reserved for
his personal action — to each according to his ability (seniority?).
rfhile agreeing that the Principal Policy Officer should be free to
establish a flexible, simple unit that is responsive to his needs, an
admonition concerning "empire building " seems appropriate. Budgetary
limitations permitting, a tendency in the growth of offices may be
expected, possibly creating a new layering problem. Personnel should be
assigned only if thev meet specific requirements of the job to be done.
General Lauris Norstad has stated that in organizing an important planning
office he used five colonels without staff divisions and thereby
accomplished in a week work that would have taken six times that much
time with a larger staff. 10
- 152 -
mma fftlmSS f| —fe—<il «d* laailV) 32|£gl ^-y- ,j -' rfa*a 2| >rlC
i* •*»»»** giH *99M o» l\a*3 »U
-iiaJSJI* -^ ^ boaiiqaoo ai Mtltt aoiVi© Jnaesrq
ban eqaa «9lA .yJiiidir9i1 lo ioai a 10I L>3iuj5> nsr'xJ aari taia»6 to
asoi'ilo ad* ~lo sni"3***a boa noitas taspio adj baaianatab 9*ad ab990 too
oa .aaaoiaud goiob to alyia owo «irt a.sn *n9bia92<i rtoaa ta jpm'i
,anoi**:t9qC i.u*iM9?o& ao 99**ia«o3 ,9*4fl9£ t«893sno0 e»?^jtf b9*inU
V
titlatiut tioq»A nlistal rut .ytlmosS Unoite.'* tc\ snisiosaiO
aeiaa*! b£ ,«e»2i . S ,yi9RirfoaM vcilo'. iBnoiifiH no 9aJJimMO0du2
• q ,(Od*l ,«aiO sni JnixS *n9ttfti9vo0 .notioidaatt)
I .asaniaud io aiyte owo aid 9vari Xiiw is.-tYiO yollol iaqi3nii<2 rfsss
baa •siTio aid tcjjtbfi a* b»aa a aad 9iol9X9rf* i«»^.f?.V) yaH©*? iaqionia?
ataoMK" laaoqeiq aldT .9ly*a aid ic a9i*tiaHu->f*g 9d* line o» aaiubaooiq
goiylqqj; ,»»iW» aid 9,oiYla*8 boa $oisiaaa.so ni *but tini 9biw mid ?aivi%
o* 9*aiiqoiqqa yitnaiias ma lizt'* 9d daidw aaiqioniiq laii^anao •»
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<
yib98oqqu2 .aaonaaer Xaiosqa aid
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Yiixoinaa) ytilida aid oi anibsooaa daaa ©J — noits* Xaooai9q aid
ad biuoda isoiYto yoiio4 A.-qisairi 9dj tad* goi99-x$a alidfcf
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ad yea aaaiYlo "io itwon^ ad* oi yscsbnai a ,9flittiari9q anoiiaiiolX
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.9nob ad ot dot **** -° 8*n*«s .qe t»9n y9rft li yXoo b9osiaaa
toiooaXq ta*txoq«i oa soisinasto oi $Bdt b9*«ta ear! butztnV. aiiuaJ Xa?9O90
ydaiarit boa anoisivro :-i..jt iuodtiw eXaooXoa 9vi\ b»8u 9rf soitio
ri3os tadi a9ait xia naiiat avsrf bXoow tad} isow i99w a ni b9daiXqaK>:>3a
Vtate l^ici a dliw 9«it
X -
10United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Administration of National Security . Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session,
March 11, 22, and 25, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963),
part I.
The chart which follows depicts the organization of the Office of
Central American and Panamanian Affairs as it was until March, 1964, and
two alternative structures. As proposed, the alternative structures do
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From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus ,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).
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Initiate a One- Year Program for Phasing into the Principal 1'olicy
Officer Concept as Rapidly as Officers with Demonstrated l-xecutive and
Leadership Ability Are Available for Such Assignments .
This rccorsnendaticn indicates that a master plan for the top
structure of each bureau should be formulate.! by the regional Assistant
Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, acting in
concert. This plan should specify the number of Principal Policy
Officers required, their names, and scheduled rotation uates. Exceptions
should be made to normal tour of duty practices until all Principal
Policy Officer positions are filled with those chosen.
designate to Each Bureau One Alter Ego Deputy Assistant Secretary .
Other than an alter ego deputy, any deputy position in the chain
of command constitutes a layer and should, for that reason, be subject
to careful scrutiny. Any deputy between the Assistant Secretary and
the Principal Policy Officer tends to diffuse responsibility and creates
uncertainty in leadership. However, when the Assistant Secretary is
out of his office or otherwise occupied, an alter ego deputy with full
authority and responsibility would be useful. Such a deputy would not
necessarily constitute an additional layer.
The present proliferation of Deputy Assistant Secretaries is a
result of assigning this title to non-line, functional advisors — a
Bisnoner applied for purposes of prestige. There are, of course, a
few line deputies, such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic
Affairs, who supervise organizations concerned with other than country
affairs, and whose existence does not denegrate the principle of country
responsibility. However, the precedents which their existence creates
can be kept within rational bounds only by the most disciplined
- 155 -
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organizations. In the case of non-line deputy Assistant Secretaries,
the title suggests an involvement in the chain of command which is
unwarranted and debases the use of the title until its prestige value
is lost.
When present incumbencies are terminated, or better, as the
Principal Policy Officer concept is initiated, non-line ueputy Assistant
Secretaries should be given new titles, commensurate with their advisory
functions, which are properly reflective of the prestige that is their
due.
Restrict Functional Advisors , and All Other Officers outside of the
Direct Chain of Command , to Advisory and Liaison Roles and Reduce the
Number of Those at the Bureau Level as the Principal Policy Officer
Concept Is Phased into the Bureau Organization
.
A misunderstanding of the role of the functional advisor is
responsible for confusion in the bureau lines of authority and sub-
stantially contributes to delays in action. The purpose of the
functional advisor is a staff function. Line officers should decide
when to seek advice and how to use it. The need for specialist advisors
varies among bureaus and among geographic areas within bureaus. In
accordance with the idea of permitting the Principal Policy Officer the
freedom to structure his own staff, he should determine the necessity
for the type and number of functional advisors in his organization.
After this is done, the essentiality of each bureau-level advisor should









The preceding pages of this chapter have presented a detailed
description of the methods by which the role of the country desk officer
was to be enhanced. The principle of responsibility for action coupled
with commensurate authority is recognized, but only a few mincing steps
were suggested in placing that responsibility where it logically belongs.
If the Principal Policy Officer were required to administer the relations
of the United States with more than one country, no matter how quiescent
the status of such relations might be, the "country team in Washington"
counterpart of the embassy's country team is compromised in principle.
Half measures are insufficient. If an overhaul of the department's
administrative procedures is to be undertaken, then that overhaul should
be complete and in consonance with the concept that provides its basis.
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A New Assistant Secretary
In December, 1963, after President Johnson had been in office
for a decent interval, he announced the ensuing replacement of the
Honorable Edwin M. Martin by the Honorable Thomas C. Mann in the
position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
At the same time, President Johnson designated Assistant Secretary
Mann as Special Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs
and Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress.
As Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Assistant Secretary
Mann was given the broad powers of an Assistant Administrator of A. I. J>.
This was the first step in the direction of fully integrating the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Bureau for Latin America,
A. I. x).
As Special Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs,
there lies a danger that a special relationship between Assistant
Secretary Mann and the President might impinge on the relationship
which should exist between the President and the Secretary of State.
It is obligatory that the President should be careful not to ask a
subordinate officer to handle independently tasks which fall within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. A situation of this
nature could destroy the effectiveness of the Secretary of State.
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Reorganization
Just as the President reorganizes eleraents of the executive
branch to accommodate his manner of conducting business, so Assistant
Secretary Mann was afforded the opportunity of adapting the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs to accommodate his idiosyncrasies. Prom
January until March he discussed proposals for reorganization with the
higher echelons of A. I. o. t office directors, and country desk
officers. He also studied those proposals suggested by the Office of
Management. The organization which Assistant Secretary Mann decided
upon was promulgated in March, 1964. While it goes farther toward
the principle of one country desk officer per country than did the
Office of Management Study, it does not proceed to the logical con-
clusion which that principle implies. Ten regional offices have replaced
the seven previously extant. Panamanian Affairs were accorded a separate
office because of the crisis in United States/Panamanian relations
which occurred in January, 1964, while the reorganization plan was being
developed.
Objectives
The reorganization had two objectives; (1) to place greater
decision-making authority within the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
and the Bureau for Latin America, A. I. 0., and (2) to bring the staffs
of the two Bureaus closer together in the interest cf effective
operations.
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and Bureau for Latin America,
A. I. i>., Department of State, Organizational Information (Washington
:
Department of State, 1964), p. 1.
- 165 -
1% *ri i mm is.
}nstei««A o8 ,cc»al«ud s -tfibimmoa* o* dsnsid
lo uAVXiifl ad* inl>q«tM "k> yfloutloqq© art* toabioYL* *sv aiuM v»****3*2
ejo^o, .••ie*ionvac >* «*si*Y^A n«3iiasr'wrj*nl
is- .* ^> sfl torts id
i bste»s^u« ei«eoc •* ©«I* »H .eiaDilV)
>n*J4 5fia*a*3a& --lio »rf f .*nama8*fi»M
biswo* iad*i«* eaos, *1 *i ,rt:riftK ni b»*n ««* J!
^o iaafe yttrtuoo aix> T» atqioniiq «il*
-no» laoijoi ad* 91 ta: i ,jtx >si*%&a».
baaaiqai ovAri saoltto liinoiasi .aaiiqpi aiqianlsq tart* rioiriw noi^
..^•>; .-,v, « ^mr silcViA a*lasaaaa<i ,*tt£*xa y.. -*Q ***** »rfJ
MWltSi _ :- \Ca***<! b&tilM ! 5i C '* J "5 - i^l -^ •Wl*3*l aolllO




»V kJ 1*1 u«*vua »*<t bos
>* iMoD ewe»itJ« ami m
.i - ' "
~
—
^ ,(^6?- ,»*b*£ *© *nan*iaqa<i
. tdi -
In order to accomplish these aims, the following steps have been
taken
:
The geographic desks of the two bureaus have been
physically colocated.
Joint economic offices have been organized under the
administration of a Deputy Assistant Secretary who is
also designated as Deputy Assistant Administrator.
The Comprehensive Country Planning System has been
installed in several Latin American Posts.
The New Office Director
The Office Directors have received new titles ~ Directors of
Country Affairs. They are to be the single focal point of authority
and responsibility from which other government officials may request
advice, information, and guidance in administering the sundry facets
of any program in that country. A political, economic, and develop-
ment staff is provided to support their efforts.
Office Reorganization
Recognizing that the directors of Country Affairs, too, have their
quirks in conducting business, they have been permitted to organize
their offices, using personnel of the two Bureaus of Inter-American
Affairs and Latin America, A. I, D., as they see fit to provide a
flexibility in consonance with their personal working styles. Personnel
of the two bureaus receive direction and supervision in their daily
tasks from the Directors of Country Affairs, but continue to receive
a modicum of guidance from their parent organizations.
Directors of Country Affairs are officers assigned indiscriminately
from either of the two bureaus, ability to see the broad picture and
excellence in performance being the criteria for such assignment. Their
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staffs have been selected from the two bureaus on the same basis and
are used interchangeably in handling peak work loads.
Layering
The reorganization, as promulgated, supposedly reduced layering
of staff and states that directors of Country Affairs report directly
to the Assistant Secretary; Jeputy Assistant Secretaries providing
policy guidance in their respective areas of responsibility only, they
will not need to pass on most papers.
In practice, it is apparent that layering has not been significantly
reduced. Directors still have Deputy Directors, and the Assistant
Secretary still has Deputy Assistant Secretaries. However, there is
one Deputy Assistant Secretary who is an alter ego Deputy Assistant
Secretary in every respect. Nevertheless, the proliferation of Deputy
Assistant Secretaries has not reduced the problem of compound reviews
on this level. The dual nature of State/A. I. D, affairs has only
eliminated the problem of compound reviews and chasing concurrence in
purely political, economic, or development policies. Other policy
matters remain essentially as before.
Whither the Country Desk Officer
Brazilian, Panamanian, and Mexican affairs were considered
sufficiently important and pressing to require their organization
into separate offices. Elsewhere, country affairs are essentially
managed by the same country desk officers described in the preceding
pages. These country desk officers are still some seven or eight
levels away from the Secretary of State. Excepting policy matters for
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reduced. Policy problems for ninety-three other country desk officers
remain the same.
The organizational charts printed on the following pages illustrate
the combined Bureaus of Inter-American Affairs and Latin America, A. I. o.
as they exist at this time and the organization of their several
regional bureaus.
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From the evidence presented in the preceding pages, it can be
deterained that the present country desk officer* s role in major
policy decisions is more myth than reality. His position is best
described by using familiar naval terminology — he is analgous to
a ship's navigator. The desk officer recommends courses which his
commanding officer (Director of Country Affairs) and his commodore
(Assistant Secretary) may or may not follow, depending on their
assessment of the proposed course and their inclinations.
If the country desk officer possesses a strong personality
and his Director of Country Affairs has a weaker personality, the
strength of his character may serve to impose his views in policy
matters. Likewise, each paper drafted by the country desk officer
can easily be slanted, emphasizing his views and belittling or
omitting opposing viewpoints. Their acceptance wholly or "cum
grano salis" by the Director of Country Affairs and other higher
authority is dependent upon a personal relationship — the measure of
trust and confidence which senior officials place in the country desk
officer.
In spite of the clear recognition of the problem by Secretary
Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, and other senior Department of
State officials, only a few steps have been taken toward the reduction
of layering. Has the bureaucracy captured these supreme arbiters of
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policy? Some ninety-three country desk officers still remain seven
or eight levels down from the Secretary.
It seems logical to me, as has been suggested, that the
elimination of layering is a desirable method of making better, more
responsible policy, Either the Office director (director of Country
Affairs, ARA/LA) in his present form (Brazil, Panama, and Mexico
Offices exempted) should be eliminated, or the country desk officer
in his present form should be excised. Personally, I believe that the
interests of the nation could best be served in the creation of a
separate office for each country in order to carry the country team in
Washington concept to its logical conclusion. These Office directors
should be of the grade of CAREER MINISTKR/PSO-1, with commensurate
experience and proven capability in administering the affairs of their
client countries — real counterparts of the ambassador and his country
team. If a country is sufficiently important to the United States as
to require an ambassador and a supporting team, then a counterpart
country team in Washington is a logical conclusion.
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